Luanpdd Kit MCP Server
@luanpdd/kit-mcp
npm
v1.46.0
Source verified
Published by luanpdd — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Generic infrastructure to ship YOUR personal kit of agents/commands/skills as an MCP server, with cross-IDE sync (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, Antigravity, Copilot, Trae).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (kit/framework/bin/lib/commands.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kit/framework/bin/lib/commands.cjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const { safeReadFile, loadConfig, isGitIgnored, execGit, normalizePhaseName, co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/framework/bin/lib/commands.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (kit/framework/bin/lib/core.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kit/framework/bin/lib/core.cjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const { MODEL_PROFILES } = require('./model-profiles.cjs'); // ─── Path helper
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/framework/bin/lib/core.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (kit/framework/bin/lib/init.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kit/framework/bin/lib/init.cjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const { loadConfig, resolveModelInternal, findPhaseInternal, getRoadmapPhaseInt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/framework/bin/lib/init.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (kit/hooks/check-update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kit/hooks/check-update.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const homeDir = os.homedir(); const cwd = process.cwd(); // Detect runtime co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/hooks/check-update.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (kit/hooks/post-apply-migration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`kit/hooks/post-apply-migration.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); let input = ''; const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 3000);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/hooks/post-apply-migration.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/index.js:1313`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); const here = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const script
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/cost/aggregate-phase.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/cost/aggregate-phase.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { discover } from './discovery.js'; import { parseJsonlFile } from './par
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/cost/aggregate-phase.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/gate-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/gate-runner.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import os from 'node:os'; import { createInterface } from 'node:readline/promise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/gate-runner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/notify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/notify.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; const DEFAULT_THROTTLE_MS = 5000; let lastNotifyAt = 0; function throttleMs()
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/notify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ui/auto-spawn.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ui/auto-spawn.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import http from 'node:http'; import path from 'node:path'; import process from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ui/auto-spawn.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (kit/framework/bin/lib/commands.cjs)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`kit/framework/bin/lib/commands.cjs:472`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search?${params}`, { headers
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/framework/bin/lib/commands.cjs
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/reflect.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/core/reflect.js:158`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const res = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/reflect.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (kit/hooks/post-apply-migration.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`kit/hooks/post-apply-migration.js:101`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { try { execSync(`git add "${path.relative(projectRoot, mirroredPath)}"`, { cwd: projectRoot, stdio: 'ig
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server kit/hooks/post-apply-migration.js
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kitingests untrusted inputack-restartno sensitive capabilityauto-installno sensitive capabilitycost-blocksno sensitive capabilitycost-estimateno sensitive capabilitycost-phaseno sensitive capabilitycost-sessionno sensitive capabilitycost-todayno sensitive capabilityforensicsno sensitive capabilitygatesno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
installno sensitive capabilitymetrics-snapshotno sensitive capabilitypackno sensitive capabilityprojectsno sensitive capabilityreverse-syncno sensitive capabilitysyncno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.46.0 latest |
B 84/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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