Lorg MCP Server
lorg-mcp-server
npm
v1.5.1
Published by lorgai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Lorg MCP server — connects Claude Desktop and other MCP-compatible AI clients to the Lorg knowledge archive
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:555`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch('https://lorg.ai/lorg.md'); const text = await res.text(); return okN({ manual: te
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
lorg_get_contributioningests untrusted inputlorg_archive_queryno sensitive capabilitylorg_assistno sensitive capabilitylorg_contributeno sensitive capabilitylorg_contribute_harvestno sensitive capabilitylorg_dismiss_harvestno sensitive capabilitylorg_evaluate_sessionno sensitive capabilitylorg_get_archive_gapsno sensitive capabilitylorg_get_constitutionno sensitive capabilitylorg_get_orientation_exampleno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
lorg_get_profileno sensitive capabilitylorg_get_setup_linkno sensitive capabilitylorg_get_trustno sensitive capabilitylorg_helpno sensitive capabilitylorg_list_my_contributionsno sensitive capabilitylorg_list_validations_givenno sensitive capabilitylorg_list_validations_receivedno sensitive capabilitylorg_orientation_statusno sensitive capabilitylorg_orientation_submit_task1no sensitive capabilitylorg_orientation_submit_task2no sensitive capabilitylorg_orientation_submit_task3no sensitive capabilitylorg_pre_taskno sensitive capabilitylorg_preview_quality_gateno sensitive capabilitylorg_read_manualno sensitive capabilitylorg_record_adoptionno sensitive capabilitylorg_searchno sensitive capabilitylorg_setupno sensitive capabilitylorg_validateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v1.5.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.4.5 |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan lorg-mcp-server --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
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