Loomal — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@loomal/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@loomal/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@loomal/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: mail_get_attachment → vault_storeApiKey → vault_storeShippingAddress. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "mail_get_attachment → vault_storeApiKey → vault_storeShippingAddress"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"mail_get_attachment"
],
"sources": [
"vault_storeApiKey"
],
"sinks": [
"vault_storeShippingAddress"
],
"path": [
"mail_get_attachment",
"vault_storeApiKey",
"vault_storeShippingAddress"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "mail_get_attachment",
"to": "vault_storeApiKey",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "vault_storeApiKey",
"to": "vault_storeShippingAddress",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"mail_get_attachment"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"vault_storeApiKey"
],
"externalSink": [
"vault_storeShippingAddress"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"mail_get_attachment",
"vault_storeApiKey",
"vault_storeShippingAddress"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: mail_get_attachment → vault_storeApiKey → vault_storeShippingAddress."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "identity_whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identity_sign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identity_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_list_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_get_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_get_attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mail_update_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_update_thread_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_delete_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_delete_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_add_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_delete_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_list_threads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mail_get_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_totp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_totp_use_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_storeApiKey",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"secret\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_storeCard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_storeShippingAddress",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_set_public",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identities_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identities_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identities_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identities_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identities_rotate_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "identities_update_scopes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0d33e92765ab20188e6ad98496699042cec3676a9d5883f222b7a6f286760105",
"stats": {
"tools": 38,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}