Longhand MCP Server
longhand
PyPI
v1.0.1
Published by wynelson94 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Persistent local memory for Claude Code. Total recall from your session files — no API calls, no summaries, no AI deciding what matters.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (longhand/recall/project_fallback.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`longhand/recall/project_fallback.py:186`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as log_fh: subprocess.Popen( # "-m longhand" (the package __main__), NOT "-m longhand.cli":
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server longhand/recall/project_fallback.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_db_compat.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_db_compat.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ).group(1) ns = {}; exec(git_show("<tag>:longhand/storage/migrations.py"), ns) conn.executescript(SCHEMA) ns
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_db_compat.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ingest_live.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ingest_live.py:220`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ill(pid, 0). proc = subprocess.Popen(["/bin/sleep", "5"]) try: # Give the kernel a beat to register the
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_ingest_live.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_project_fallback.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_project_fallback.py:242`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: on it.""" result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "longhand", "--help"], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_project_fallback.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_surface_consistency.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_surface_consistency.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st_` lies.""" out = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "pytest", "--collect-only", "-q", "-p", "no:cache
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_surface_consistency.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.13.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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