Loki Mode — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "loki-mode",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "loki-mode"
},
"server": {
"name": "loki-mode"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 78,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"gateCap": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 22
}
],
"gatesFired": [
"1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C"
],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (agents/hub_install.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agents/hub_install.py:406`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agents/hub_install.py"
},
"evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "agents/hub_install.py",
"line": 406
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dashboard/server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dashboard/server.py:3593`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dashboard/server.py"
},
"evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dashboard/server.py",
"line": 3593
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (memory/ingest.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memory/ingest.py:76`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memory/ingest.py"
},
"evidence": ".aws/credentials",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "memory/ingest.py",
"line": 76
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (autonomy/lib/secure-scan.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `autonomy/lib/secure-scan.py:138`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/secure-scan.py"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "autonomy/lib/secure-scan.py",
"line": 138
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agents/hub_install.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agents/hub_install.py:408`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agents/hub_install.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agents/hub_install.py",
"line": 408
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (api/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`api/server.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "api/server.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "api/server.js",
"line": 29
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (api/test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`api/test.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "api/test.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "api/test.js",
"line": 29
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/api-server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/api-server.js:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/api-server.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/api-server.js",
"line": 32
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/checklist-verify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/checklist-verify.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/checklist-verify.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/checklist-verify.py",
"line": 136
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py",
"line": 79
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py",
"line": 61
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py:281`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py",
"line": 281
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/proof-generator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/proof-generator.py:613`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/proof-generator.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/proof-generator.py",
"line": 613
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/proof-verify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/proof-verify.py:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/proof-verify.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/proof-verify.py",
"line": 92
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-BQk-MUjn.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-BQk-MUjn.js:27`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-BQk-MUjn.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${W}`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-BQk-MUjn.js",
"line": 27
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (web-app/dist/assets/index-B-0iHBPO.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`web-app/dist/assets/index-B-0iHBPO.js:61`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "web-app/dist/assets/index-B-0iHBPO.js"
},
"evidence": "import(i.module)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "web-app/dist/assets/index-B-0iHBPO.js",
"line": 61
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "f8e2608648efa9fbe5ac27700909b7709cd60f41b7cb8478a2206ced6b476142",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 14,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}