Loki Mode — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "loki-mode",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "loki-mode"
},
"server": {
"name": "loki-mode"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (memory/ingest.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memory/ingest.py:85`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memory/ingest.py"
},
"evidence": "\"/credentials\", \"/.netrc\", \"/.npmrc\", \"/.pypirc\", ) _SENSITIVE_PATH_BASENAMES = ( \".env\", \".env.l",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "memory/ingest.py",
"line": 85,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (loki-ts/dist/loki.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`loki-ts/dist/loki.js:991`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "loki-ts/dist/loki.js"
},
"evidence": "code.process(k,N);let _=Function(`${Y.default.self}`,`${Y.default.scope}`,k)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.value(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "loki-ts/dist/loki.js",
"line": 991,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agents/hub_install.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agents/hub_install.py:420`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agents/hub_install.py"
},
"evidence": "MPT\"] = \"0\" subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"clone\", \"--depth\", \"1\", \"--no-tags\", source, tmp],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agents/hub_install.py",
"line": 420,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (api/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`api/server.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "api/server.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { EventEmitter } = require('events'); //================================",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "api/server.js",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (api/test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`api/test.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "api/test.js"
},
"evidence": ", execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); //====================",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "api/test.js",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/api-server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/api-server.js:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/api-server.js"
},
"evidence": ", execSync } = require('child_process'); // Validate port number is in valid range function isValidPort(port) { ret",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/api-server.js",
"line": 32,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/checklist-verify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/checklist-verify.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/checklist-verify.py"
},
"evidence": "proc = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=project_dir,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/checklist-verify.py",
"line": 136,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.P",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/checkpoint_sync.py",
"line": 79,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py"
},
"evidence": "urn None proc = subprocess.run( [exe, \"--version\"], capture_output=True, tex",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/crash_capture.py",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/deadline.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/deadline.py:604`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/deadline.py"
},
"evidence": "ble\") process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, \"-c\", _EXEC_BOOTSTRAP, str(gate_read), *command],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/deadline.py",
"line": 604,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py:281`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( base, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/effort_estimator.py",
"line": 281,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (autonomy/lib/fast_verify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`autonomy/lib/fast_verify.py:171`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "autonomy/lib/fast_verify.py"
},
"evidence": "r: try: p = subprocess.run([\"git\"] + args, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=Tru",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "autonomy/lib/fast_verify.py",
"line": 171,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-CVJcI5pQ.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-CVJcI5pQ.js:27`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-CVJcI5pQ.js"
},
"evidence": "ait Promise.allSettled([fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${W}`),fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${W}/contributors",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "web-app/dist/assets/HomePage-CVJcI5pQ.js",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (loki-ts/dist/loki.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`loki-ts/dist/loki.js:1141`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "loki-ts/dist/loki.js"
},
"evidence": "y{Q=await fW0(Z)??await import(Z)}catch{return null}for(let Y of X)if(typeof Q[Y]!==\"function\"){let J=Q[Y]===void 0?\"mis",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "loki-ts/dist/loki.js",
"line": 1141,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (web-app/dist/assets/index-CLvjO22Z.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`web-app/dist/assets/index-CLvjO22Z.js:61`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "web-app/dist/assets/index-CLvjO22Z.js"
},
"evidence": "c[i.id];try{let r=await import(i.module);return c[i.id]=r,r}catch(r){return console.error(`Error loading route module \\`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "web-app/dist/assets/index-CLvjO22Z.js",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "lsp_find_references",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lsp_go_to_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lsp_symbol_at_position",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lsp_check_exists",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lsp_get_diagnostics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lsp_workspace_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lsp_find_definition_by_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_memory_redact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_memory_retrieve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_memory_store_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_task_queue_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_task_queue_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_task_queue_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_state_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_metrics_efficiency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_memory_capture_session_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_consolidate_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_complete_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_start_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_project_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_agent_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_checkpoint_restore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_quality_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_code_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_code_search_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mem_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mem_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mem_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "loki_get_hotspots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_get_co_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_get_doc_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_learnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_graph_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_verify_fast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "loki_counter_evidence_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "37aee66e073c991a267aab6610916d3b38a4608d87f37d93dfde0ed0b132395f",
"stats": {
"tools": 36,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 12,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}