Lokalise (AbdallahAHO) MCP Server
lokalise-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Published by abdallahaho — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The Lokalise MCP Server brings Lokalise's localization power to Claude and AI assistants—manage projects, keys, and translations by chat.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([lokalise_list_keys, lokalise_create_keys, lokalise_delete_project]) and tools that can send data out ([lokalise_list_key_comments, lokalise_create_comments]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [lokalise_list_keys, lokalise_create_keys, lokalise_delete_project] → sinks [lokalise_list_key_comments, lokalise_create_comments]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow lokalise_list_keys → lokalise_list_key_comments
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/lokalise-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/lokalise-mcp.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { dirname, join } from "node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/lokalise-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/shared/utils/cli.test.util.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/utils/cli.test.util.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { expect } from "vitest"; /** * Utilit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/shared/utils/cli.test.util.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/domains/registry.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/domains/registry.js:102`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st domainModule = await import(indexPath); // Extract tool, CLI, and resource exports based on naming conven
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/domains/registry.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"lokalise-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/ensure-executable.js 2>/dev/null || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package lokalise-mcp
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
lokalise_create_commentsnetwork egresslokalise_create_keysreads sensitive datalokalise_delete_projectreads sensitive datalokalise_list_key_commentsnetwork egresslokalise_list_keysreads sensitive datalokalise_add_contributorsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_add_members_to_groupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_add_project_languagesno sensitive capabilitylokalise_add_projects_to_groupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_bulk_delete_keysno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
lokalise_bulk_update_keysno sensitive capabilitylokalise_bulk_update_translationsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_create_glossary_termsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_create_projectno sensitive capabilitylokalise_create_taskno sensitive capabilitylokalise_create_usergroupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_delete_commentno sensitive capabilitylokalise_delete_glossary_termsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_delete_keyno sensitive capabilitylokalise_delete_taskno sensitive capabilitylokalise_delete_team_userno sensitive capabilitylokalise_delete_usergroupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_empty_projectno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_commentno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_contributorno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_current_userno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_glossary_termno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_keyno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_languageno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_projectno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_queued_processno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_taskno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_team_userno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_translationno sensitive capabilitylokalise_get_usergroupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_contributorsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_glossary_termsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_project_commentsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_project_languagesno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_queued_processesno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_system_languagesno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_tasksno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_team_usersno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_translationsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_list_usergroupsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_remove_contributorno sensitive capabilitylokalise_remove_languageno sensitive capabilitylokalise_remove_members_from_groupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_remove_projects_from_groupno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_contributorno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_glossary_termsno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_keyno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_languageno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_projectno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_taskno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_team_userno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_translationno sensitive capabilitylokalise_update_usergroupno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan lokalise-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Lokalise 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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