Logicpatterns MCP Server

@logicpatterns/mcp-server npm v0.1.0

Published by @logicpatterns — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

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Trust grade

74/100

Last scanned 2026-07-23

Trust

C · 74/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

C Why this grade threat 85 − adoption risk = 74/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 15.1 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−6.7	Possible combosquat of mcp ×4 MTC-SUP-006	supply-chain
−6.3	Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009	injection
−2.1	Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011	supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 11 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−5	publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect
✓	inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 7

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/oauth-flow.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth-flow.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/auth/oauth-flow.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/auth/oauth-flow.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth-flow.js:33`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(`${cmd} "${

Location: server dist/auth/oauth-flow.js

medium Possible combosquat of mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@logicpatterns/mcp-server" is "mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.