locusync-server
PyPI
v1.2.0
Published by matbel91765 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for geospatial operations - geocoding, routing, spatial analysis
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`src/locusync/tools/raster.py:642`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ession result = eval(expression, {"__builtins__": {}, "np": np}, raster_data) # Handle invalid values
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/locusync/tools/raster.py
In the server's implementation (`src/locusync/tools/raster.py:642`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ession result = eval(expression, {"__builtins__": {}, "np": np}, raster_data) # Handle invalid values
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/locusync/tools/raster.py
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
read_filereads sensitive datawrite_filewrites filesareano sensitive capabilitybufferno sensitive capabilitycentroidno sensitive capabilitychoropleth_mapno sensitive capabilityclipno sensitive capabilityconvex_hullno sensitive capabilitycrs_infono sensitive capabilitydissolveno sensitive capabilitydistanceno sensitive capabilityelevationno sensitive capabilityelevation_profileno sensitive capabilityenvelopeno sensitive capabilitygeocodeno sensitive capabilityhillshadeno sensitive capabilityhotspot_analysisno sensitive capabilityisochroneno sensitive capabilitylengthno sensitive capabilitylocal_moranno sensitive capabilitymergeno sensitive capabilitymoran_ino sensitive capabilityndvino sensitive capabilityoverlayno sensitive capabilityraster_calcno sensitive capabilityread_rasterno sensitive capabilityreproject_rasterno sensitive capabilityreverse_geocodeno sensitive capabilityrouteno sensitive capabilitysimplifyno sensitive capabilityslopeno sensitive capabilityspatial_joinno sensitive capabilityspatial_queryno sensitive capabilityspatial_weightsno sensitive capabilitystatic_mapno sensitive capabilitytransform_crsno sensitive capabilityutm_zoneno sensitive capabilityvalidateno sensitive capabilityweb_mapno sensitive capabilityzonal_statsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan locusync-server --online --registry pypi
MCP server for Australian address search and validation via Addressr
Admissions data & match scores for law, medical, dental, MBA, pharmacy, vet, optometry schools
Live AI data for agents: model releases, regulations (EU AI Act), GenAI glossary, daily news.
AirTreks MCP Server — complex flight routing intelligence for AI agents. Plan multi-city trips, validate alliance routings, get carrier recommendations, and create trip ideas.
Physician-reviewed medical opinions and prescriptions for AI agents.
Thin MCP server + CLI that proxy the atrium /api/v1 observability surface using an oc_live_ Bearer key. Talks HTTP only — no Convex imports.