Lockstep — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "lockstep-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "lockstep-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "lockstep-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (43 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"command_run\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"command_run\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "command_run"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dashboard.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/dashboard.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import { WebSocketServer } from \"ws\"; import { loadConfig } from \"./config.js\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/dashboard.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/macos.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/macos.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/macos.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"node:url\"; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/macos.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = path.dirnam",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tmux.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tmux.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tmux.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { getPlannerPrompt, getImplementerPrompt }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tmux.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/worktree.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/worktree.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/worktree.js"
},
"evidence": "ecCallback } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import fs f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/worktree.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/dashboard.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard.js:33`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/dashboard.js"
},
"evidence": "t found\" `; exec(`osascript -e '${script.replace(/'/g, \"'\\\"'\\\"'\")}'`, (error, stdout) => { if (e",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/dashboard.js",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/worktree.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/worktree.js:60`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/worktree.js"
},
"evidence": "try { await exec(`git branch -D \"${branchName}\"`, { cwd: gitRoot }); } catch { // Branch doe",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/worktree.js",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"command_run\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"command_run\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "command_run",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"command_run\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"command_run\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "command_run"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "status_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_submit_for_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_approve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_request_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_approve_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "task_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lock_acquire",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lock_release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lock_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "note_append",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "note_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "artifact_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "artifact_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "command_run",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "tool_install",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_append",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coordination_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_context_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_context_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_status_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "launch_implementer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "implementer_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "implementer_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dashboard_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discussion_cleanup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worktree_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worktree_merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worktree_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "worktree_cleanup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3225d3d44532d33ca891098b1fd9444a7050717af7fbf3f8ff89e7a88467d3c6",
"stats": {
"tools": 43,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}