Lockin MCP Server
lockin-mcp
npm
v1.0.19
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
LockIn MCP — block distractions at the system level with AI-powered focus tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hosts-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/hosts-manager.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ile, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hosts-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/auto-update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/auto-update.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { access, cp, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rename, rm, writeFile, } from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/auto-update.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/clipboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/clipboard.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; export async function copyToClipboard(text) { const commands = process.platf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/clipboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/daemon-linux.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/daemon-linux.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { getDaemonPath } from "./daemon-path.js"; const execFileAsync = promisif
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/daemon-linux.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/daemon-windows.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/daemon-windows.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ile, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { getDaemonPath } from "./daemon-path.js"; import { getInstallDir } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/daemon-windows.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/daemon.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { getDaemonPath } from "./daemon-path.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/dev-reset.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/dev-reset.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { access, mkdir, rm, unlink } from "node:fs/promises"; import { join } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/dev-reset.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/hosts-sudo.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/hosts-sudo.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ile, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { access, chmod, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { homedir }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/hosts-sudo.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/legacy-tunnels.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/legacy-tunnels.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { access } from "node:fs/promises"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/legacy-tunnels.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installer/mcp-cleanup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installer/mcp-cleanup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { access } from "node:fs/promises"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installer/mcp-cleanup.js
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
archive_focus_taskno sensitive capabilityblock_appsno sensitive capabilityblock_domainsno sensitive capabilityclear_active_focus_taskno sensitive capabilitycomplete_focus_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_focus_taskno sensitive capabilityenter_focus_modeno sensitive capabilityget_active_focus_taskno sensitive capabilityget_agent_guidelinesno sensitive capabilityget_block_statusno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
get_focus_reportno sensitive capabilityget_focus_scheduleno sensitive capabilitylist_focus_tasksno sensitive capabilityset_active_focus_taskno sensitive capabilityset_focus_scheduleno sensitive capabilitytemporarily_unblock_appsno sensitive capabilitytemporarily_unblock_domainsno sensitive capabilityunblock_appsno sensitive capabilityunblock_domainsno sensitive capabilityupdate_focus_taskno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.19 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.16 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v1.0.15 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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