Localant — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "localant",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "localant"
},
"server": {
"name": "localant"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js:7`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js"
},
"evidence": "/ const SSH_PUBKEYS = [\"id_ed25519.pub\", \"id_rsa.pub\", \"id_ecdsa.pub\"]; function sshDir() { return path.join(os.home",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (packages/gateway/dist/tools/autopilot.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/gateway/dist/tools/autopilot.js:23`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/gateway/dist/tools/autopilot.js"
},
"evidence": "hard\", \".env\", \"id_rsa\", \"id_ed25519\", \".npmrc\", \"token\", \"secret\", \"credential\", \"keych",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "packages/gateway/dist/tools/autopilot.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (packages/shared/dist/paths.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/shared/dist/paths.js:105`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/shared/dist/paths.js"
},
"evidence": "path.join(home, \".npmrc\"), path.join(home, \".netrc\"), ]; if (process.platform === \"darwin\") {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "packages/shared/dist/paths.js",
"line": 105,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/autostart.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/autostart.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/autostart.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; /** launchd label for the LocalAnt gateway LaunchAgent. */ const LABEL = \"com.lo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/autostart.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/bin.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/bin.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/bin.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { Command } from \"commander\"; import { createGateway } from \"@localant/ga",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/bin.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/optional-deps.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/optional-deps.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/optional-deps.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { commandExists, optionalDepsDir, resolveOptionalDep } from \"@localant/ga",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/optional-deps.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import path from \"node:path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/serveo-setup.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/shared-router.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/shared-router.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/shared-router.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { resolveTailscale, tailscaleEnv } from \"@localant/gateway\"; const ROUTER",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/shared-router.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/tailscale-setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/tailscale-setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/tailscale-setup.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { resolveTailscale } from \"@localant/gateway\"; import { c, ok, warn, open",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/tailscale-setup.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/util.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/util.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/cli/dist/util.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import readline from \"node:readline\"; const useColor = process.stdout.isTTY && !",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/cli/dist/util.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/gateway/dist/managers/coding-agent-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/gateway/dist/managers/coding-agent-manager.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/gateway/dist/managers/coding-agent-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import { nanoid } from \"nanoid\"; import { commandExist",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/gateway/dist/managers/coding-agent-manager.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/skills/article-publisher/src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/skills/article-publisher/src/index.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "examples/skills/article-publisher/src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { promisify } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "examples/skills/article-publisher/src/index.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/skills/local-backup/src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/skills/local-backup/src/index.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "examples/skills/local-backup/src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { promisify } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "examples/skills/local-backup/src/index.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"localant\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "localant"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "4791fcc2c17b2a2267e4fd0c1c34c2476d2d12cc7da8a1e52f78d92284752721",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}