Local Mcp MCP Server

https://local-mcp.com/mcp Remote v1.0

Published by local-mcp.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

180 local tools from ChatGPT, Claude.ai & desktop AIs: Mail, iMessage, Teams, files. Local, free.

Trust grade
C
77/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
C · 77/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Live
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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C Why this grade threat 87 − adoption risk = 77/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 12.9 = 87. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−12.9 Annotation contradicts behavior on "chrome_evaluate_js" ×6 MTC-CAP-003 permissions

2. Client adoption risk — 87 − 10 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 25

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: list_email_accounts → gdrive_list_files → chrome_evaluate_js. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow list_email_accounts → gdrive_list_files → chrome_evaluate_js

high Tool "chrome_evaluate_js" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "chrome_evaluate_js" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool chrome_evaluate_js

high Tool "run_terminal_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "run_terminal_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool run_terminal_command

high Tool "safari_evaluate_js" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "safari_evaluate_js" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool safari_evaluate_js

high Tool "web_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "web_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool web_eval

medium Tool "gdrive_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "gdrive_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool gdrive_write_file

medium Tool "onedrive_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "onedrive_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool onedrive_delete_file

medium Tool "onedrive_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "onedrive_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool onedrive_move_file

medium Tool "onedrive_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "onedrive_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool onedrive_write_file

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "chrome_evaluate_js"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "chrome_evaluate_js" advertises readOnlyHint=true but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool chrome_evaluate_js

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "gdrive_write_file"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "gdrive_write_file" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (file-write). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool gdrive_write_file

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "onedrive_write_file"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "onedrive_write_file" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (file-write). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool onedrive_write_file

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "run_terminal_command"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "run_terminal_command" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool run_terminal_command

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "safari_evaluate_js"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "safari_evaluate_js" advertises readOnlyHint=true but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool safari_evaluate_js

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "web_eval"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "web_eval" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool web_eval

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "chrome_evaluate_js"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "chrome_evaluate_js" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool chrome_evaluate_js · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_terminal_command"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "run_terminal_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool run_terminal_command · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "safari_evaluate_js"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "safari_evaluate_js" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool safari_evaluate_js · inputSchema.properties.script

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "gdrive_list_files"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "gdrive_list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool gdrive_list_files · inputSchema.properties.path

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "gdrive_read_file"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "gdrive_read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool gdrive_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "gdrive_write_file"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "gdrive_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool gdrive_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "onedrive_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "onedrive_delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool onedrive_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "onedrive_list_files"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "onedrive_list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool onedrive_list_files · inputSchema.properties.path

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "onedrive_read_file"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "onedrive_read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool onedrive_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path

low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "onedrive_write_file"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "onedrive_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool onedrive_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path

Tools 234

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

  • chrome_evaluate_jsruns code / shell
  • create_referral_invitesnetwork egress
  • gdrive_list_filesreads sensitive data
  • gdrive_read_filereads sensitive data
  • gdrive_write_filewrites files
  • list_email_accountsingests untrusted input
  • list_emailsingests untrusted input
  • lmcp_welcomeingests untrusted input
  • m365_read_emailingests untrusted input
  • m365_send_emailnetwork egress
Show 224 more tools ↓
  • onedrive_delete_filewrites files
  • onedrive_list_filesreads sensitive data
  • onedrive_move_filewrites files
  • onedrive_read_filereads sensitive data
  • onedrive_write_filewrites files
  • read_emailingests untrusted input
  • read_messagesingests untrusted input
  • run_terminal_commandruns code / shell
  • safari_evaluate_jsruns code / shell
  • send_emailnetwork egress
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • signal_connectingests untrusted input
  • signal_list_chatsingests untrusted input
  • signal_read_messagesingests untrusted input
  • signal_send_messagenetwork egress
  • teams_list_channelsingests untrusted input
  • teams_send_messagenetwork egress
  • update_local_mcpingests untrusted input
  • web_evalruns code / shell
  • whatsapp_connectingests untrusted input
  • whatsapp_read_messagesingests untrusted input
  • whatsapp_send_messagenetwork egress
  • zalo_connectnetwork egress
  • zalo_read_messagesingests untrusted input
  • zalo_send_messagenetwork egress
  • chrome_clickno sensitive capability
  • chrome_fill_formno sensitive capability
  • chrome_go_backno sensitive capability
  • chrome_list_tabsno sensitive capability
  • chrome_navigateno sensitive capability
  • chrome_query_selector_allno sensitive capability
  • chrome_read_tabno sensitive capability
  • chrome_search_tabsno sensitive capability
  • chrome_setup_checkno sensitive capability
  • chrome_typeno sensitive capability
  • chrome_wait_forno sensitive capability
  • complete_omnifocus_taskno sensitive capability
  • complete_reminderno sensitive capability
  • connect_m365_accountno sensitive capability
  • connect_servicenowno sensitive capability
  • create_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
  • create_draftno sensitive capability
  • create_email_folderno sensitive capability
  • create_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_omnifocus_taskno sensitive capability
  • create_reminderno sensitive capability
  • create_reminder_listno sensitive capability
  • daily_briefno sensitive capability
  • delete_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
  • delete_reminderno sensitive capability
  • delete_reminder_listno sensitive capability
  • disconnect_m365_accountno sensitive capability
  • disconnect_servicenowno sensitive capability
  • excel_createno sensitive capability
  • excel_readno sensitive capability
  • excel_write_cellno sensitive capability
  • finder_listno sensitive capability
  • finder_searchno sensitive capability
  • fs_listno sensitive capability
  • fs_readno sensitive capability
  • fs_searchno sensitive capability
  • gdrive_file_infono sensitive capability
  • gdrive_rootno sensitive capability
  • gdrive_search_filesno sensitive capability
  • get_audit_logno sensitive capability
  • get_configno sensitive capability
  • get_contactno sensitive capability
  • get_datetimeno sensitive capability
  • get_m365_personno sensitive capability
  • get_weatherno sensitive capability
  • list_accountsno sensitive capability
  • list_calendar_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_calendar_namesno sensitive capability
  • list_contactsno sensitive capability
  • list_displaysno sensitive capability
  • list_email_foldersno sensitive capability
  • list_m365_people_insightsno sensitive capability
  • list_message_chatsno sensitive capability
  • list_notesno sensitive capability
  • list_omnifocus_foldersno sensitive capability
  • list_omnifocus_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_omnifocus_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_omnifocus_tasksno sensitive capability
  • list_referral_candidatesno sensitive capability
  • list_reminder_listsno sensitive capability
  • list_remindersno sensitive capability
  • list_safari_bookmarksno sensitive capability
  • list_windowsno sensitive capability
  • lmcp_stateno sensitive capability
  • m365_create_eventno sensitive capability
  • m365_delete_eventno sensitive capability
  • m365_get_contactno sensitive capability
  • m365_list_contactsno sensitive capability
  • m365_list_emailsno sensitive capability
  • m365_list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • m365_reply_emailno sensitive capability
  • m365_search_contactsno sensitive capability
  • m365_search_emailsno sensitive capability
  • media_probeno sensitive capability
  • move_emailno sensitive capability
  • nordvpn_diagnoseno sensitive capability
  • nordvpn_serversno sensitive capability
  • nordvpn_statusno sensitive capability
  • notion_list_databasesno sensitive capability
  • notion_list_pagesno sensitive capability
  • notion_list_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • notion_open_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_read_databaseno sensitive capability
  • notion_read_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_searchno sensitive capability
  • onedrive_file_infono sensitive capability
  • onedrive_rootno sensitive capability
  • onedrive_search_filesno sensitive capability
  • onedrive_set_scopeno sensitive capability
  • outlook_diagnoseno sensitive capability
  • pdf_readno sensitive capability
  • permissions_statusno sensitive capability
  • ppt_createno sensitive capability
  • ppt_readno sensitive capability
  • read_noteno sensitive capability
  • recipe_deleteno sensitive capability
  • recipe_getno sensitive capability
  • recipe_listno sensitive capability
  • recipe_runno sensitive capability
  • recipe_runsno sensitive capability
  • recipe_saveno sensitive capability
  • record_markerno sensitive capability
  • rename_reminder_listno sensitive capability
  • reply_emailno sensitive capability
  • report_problemno sensitive capability
  • request_featureno sensitive capability
  • run_diagnosticsno sensitive capability
  • safari_clickno sensitive capability
  • safari_fill_formno sensitive capability
  • safari_go_backno sensitive capability
  • safari_list_tabsno sensitive capability
  • safari_navigateno sensitive capability
  • safari_query_selector_allno sensitive capability
  • safari_read_tabno sensitive capability
  • safari_search_tabsno sensitive capability
  • safari_setup_checkno sensitive capability
  • safari_typeno sensitive capability
  • safari_wait_forno sensitive capability
  • save_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • screen_record_startno sensitive capability
  • screen_record_statusno sensitive capability
  • screen_record_stopno sensitive capability
  • screenshot_captureno sensitive capability
  • search_contactsno sensitive capability
  • search_emailsno sensitive capability
  • search_m365_directoryno sensitive capability
  • search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • search_notesno sensitive capability
  • search_omnifocus_tasksno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_add_commentno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_create_incidentno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_get_incidentno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_list_my_incidentsno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_search_incidentsno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_search_kbno sensitive capability
  • servicenow_update_incidentno sensitive capability
  • setup_installno sensitive capability
  • signal_frictionno sensitive capability
  • signal_search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • slack_list_channelsno sensitive capability
  • slack_list_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • slack_read_channel_messagesno sensitive capability
  • slack_search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • stocks_get_chartno sensitive capability
  • stocks_get_quoteno sensitive capability
  • stocks_search_symbolno sensitive capability
  • teams_call_historyno sensitive capability
  • teams_list_chatsno sensitive capability
  • teams_list_teamsno sensitive capability
  • teams_read_channel_messagesno sensitive capability
  • teams_read_chat_messagesno sensitive capability
  • teams_send_channel_messageno sensitive capability
  • todo_complete_taskno sensitive capability
  • todo_create_taskno sensitive capability
  • todo_list_listsno sensitive capability
  • todo_list_tasksno sensitive capability
  • ui_clickno sensitive capability
  • ui_find_elementno sensitive capability
  • ui_get_elementno sensitive capability
  • ui_keystrokeno sensitive capability
  • ui_menu_bar_clickno sensitive capability
  • ui_typeno sensitive capability
  • ui_wait_for_elementno sensitive capability
  • update_calendar_eventno sensitive capability
  • update_noteno sensitive capability
  • update_reminderno sensitive capability
  • update_self_diagnosisno sensitive capability
  • video_blur_regionno sensitive capability
  • video_concatno sensitive capability
  • video_export_gifno sensitive capability
  • video_reframeno sensitive capability
  • video_trimno sensitive capability
  • web_clickno sensitive capability
  • web_extractno sensitive capability
  • web_findno sensitive capability
  • web_loginno sensitive capability
  • web_navigateno sensitive capability
  • web_readno sensitive capability
  • web_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • web_session_closeno sensitive capability
  • web_session_listno sensitive capability
  • web_showno sensitive capability
  • web_typeno sensitive capability
  • web_wait_forno sensitive capability
  • whatsapp_disconnectno sensitive capability
  • whatsapp_list_chatsno sensitive capability
  • whatsapp_search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • whatsapp_send_fileno sensitive capability
  • window_focusno sensitive capability
  • window_set_frameno sensitive capability
  • word_appendno sensitive capability
  • word_createno sensitive capability
  • word_readno sensitive capability
  • zalo_diagnoseno sensitive capability
  • zalo_disconnectno sensitive capability
  • zalo_list_chatsno sensitive capability
  • zalo_search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • zoom_list_recordingsno sensitive capability
  • zoom_read_transcriptno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0 latest C 77/100 25 1.10.0 2026-07-24

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MCP Trust Score: C · 77/100
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