Mult Fetch MCP Server
@lmcc-dev/mult-fetch-mcp-server
npm
v1.3.2
Published by @lmcc-dev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An MCP protocol-based web content fetching tool that supports multiple modes and formats, can be integrated with AI assistants like Claude
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/client.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { isAccessDeniedError, isNetworkError } from './lib/utils/errorDetection.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/fetchers/common/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/fetchers/common/utils.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { log, COMPONENTS } from '../../logger.js'; import { t } from '../../i18n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/lib/fetchers/common/utils.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/client.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/client.test.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: => ({})) })); vi.mock('child_process', () => ({ execSync: vi.fn() })); // 模拟 process.exit vi.spyOn(process, 'exit')
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/client.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/fetchers/browser/BrowserFetcher.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/fetchers/browser/BrowserFetcher.test.js:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process vi.mock('child_process', () => { return { execSync: vi.fn().mockImplementation((cmd) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/fetchers/browser/BrowserFetcher.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/fetchers/node/NodeFetcher.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/fetchers/node/NodeFetcher.test.js:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 拟child_process vi.mock('child_process', () => { return { execSync: vi.fn().mockImplementation((cmd) => {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/fetchers/node/NodeFetcher.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/test-direct-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/test-direct-client.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; // 获取当前文件的目录路径 (Ge
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/test-direct-client.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/test-extract-single.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/test-extract-single.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import fs from 'fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/test-extract-single.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/test-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/test-mcp.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js'; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/test-mcp.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/test-mini4k.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/test-mini4k.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js'; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/test-mini4k.js
Tools 5
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_htmlingests untrusted inputfetch_jsoningests untrusted inputfetch_markdowningests untrusted inputfetch_plaintextingests untrusted inputfetch_txtingests untrusted input
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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