Llng MCP Server
llng-mcp
npm
v0.2.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP Server for Lemonldap-NG
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/k8s.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/k8s.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { resolvePaths } from "../config.js"; export class K8sTransport { con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/k8s.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/ssh.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/ssh.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { resolvePaths } from "../config.js"; export class SshTransport { con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/ssh.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/integration/oidc-rp.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/integration/oidc-rp.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; describe("OIDC RP Integration (via docker exec)", () => { let available = fa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/__tests__/integration/oidc-rp.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/integration/ssh-mode.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/integration/ssh-mode.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; describe("SSH Transport Integration (via docker exec)", () => { let availabl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/__tests__/integration/ssh-mode.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/k8s-transport.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/k8s-transport.test.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt/k8s.js"; import * as child_process from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "events"; vi.mock("child_proces
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/__tests__/k8s-transport.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/ssh-transport.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/ssh-transport.test.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt/ssh.js"; import * as child_process from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "events"; vi.mock("child_proces
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/__tests__/ssh-transport.test.js
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
llng_download_saml_metadataingests untrusted inputllng_oidc_metadataingests untrusted inputllng_2fa_deleteno sensitive capabilityllng_2fa_delTypeno sensitive capabilityllng_2fa_listno sensitive capabilityllng_config_addKeyno sensitive capabilityllng_config_delKeyno sensitive capabilityllng_config_exportno sensitive capabilityllng_config_getno sensitive capabilityllng_config_importno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
llng_config_infono sensitive capabilityllng_config_mergeno sensitive capabilityllng_config_rollbackno sensitive capabilityllng_config_setno sensitive capabilityllng_config_test_emailno sensitive capabilityllng_config_update_cacheno sensitive capabilityllng_consent_deleteno sensitive capabilityllng_consent_listno sensitive capabilityllng_delete_sessionno sensitive capabilityllng_doc_searchno sensitive capabilityllng_import_metadatano sensitive capabilityllng_instancesno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_authorizeno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_check_authno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_introspectno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_issuer_enableno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_refreshno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_rp_addno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_rp_deleteno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_rp_getno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_rp_listno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_tokensno sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_userinfono sensitive capabilityllng_oidc_whoamino sensitive capabilityllng_purge_central_cacheno sensitive capabilityllng_purge_local_cacheno sensitive capabilityllng_rotate_oidc_keysno sensitive capabilityllng_session_backupno sensitive capabilityllng_session_deleteno sensitive capabilityllng_session_delKeyno sensitive capabilityllng_session_getno sensitive capabilityllng_session_searchno sensitive capabilityllng_session_setKeyno sensitive capabilityllng_user_attributesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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