Llmconveyors MCP Server

llmconveyors-mcp npm v0.3.2

Published by ebenezer-isaac — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server that connects AI agents to LLM Conveyors — run Job Hunter, B2B Sales, and other AI agents from Claude, Cursor, or any MCP client

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([resume-render, upload-job-text, session-list, session-hydrate, session-download, document-download]) co-exist with external-action tools ([webhook-secret-get, webhook-secret-rotate]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [resume-render, upload-job-text, session-list, session-hydrate, session-download, document-download] → sinks [webhook-secret-get, webhook-secret-rotat

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow resume-render → webhook-secret-get

Tools 66

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • document-downloadingests untrusted input
  • resume-renderingests untrusted input
  • session-downloadingests untrusted input
  • session-hydrateingests untrusted input
  • session-listingests untrusted input
  • upload-job-textingests untrusted input
  • webhook-secret-getnetwork egress
  • webhook-secret-rotatenetwork egress
  • agent-interactno sensitive capability
  • agent-manifestno sensitive capability
Show 56 more tools ↓
  • agent-statusno sensitive capability
  • api-key-createno sensitive capability
  • api-key-listno sensitive capability
  • api-key-revokeno sensitive capability
  • api-key-rotateno sensitive capability
  • api-key-usageno sensitive capability
  • ats-scoreno sensitive capability
  • b2b-sales-runno sensitive capability
  • byo-key-getno sensitive capability
  • byo-key-removeno sensitive capability
  • byo-key-setno sensitive capability
  • content-delete-generationno sensitive capability
  • content-delete-sourceno sensitive capability
  • content-get-sourceno sensitive capability
  • content-list-sourcesno sensitive capability
  • content-research-senderno sensitive capability
  • content-saveno sensitive capability
  • health-checkno sensitive capability
  • health-liveno sensitive capability
  • health-readyno sensitive capability
  • health-rootno sensitive capability
  • job-hunter-generate-cvno sensitive capability
  • job-hunter-runno sensitive capability
  • master-resume-deleteno sensitive capability
  • master-resume-getno sensitive capability
  • master-resume-upsertno sensitive capability
  • privacy-grant-consentno sensitive capability
  • privacy-list-consentsno sensitive capability
  • privacy-revoke-consentno sensitive capability
  • referral-codeno sensitive capability
  • referral-statsno sensitive capability
  • referral-vanity-codeno sensitive capability
  • resume-export-rxno sensitive capability
  • resume-import-rxno sensitive capability
  • resume-parseno sensitive capability
  • resume-previewno sensitive capability
  • resume-themesno sensitive capability
  • resume-validateno sensitive capability
  • session-createno sensitive capability
  • session-deleteno sensitive capability
  • session-getno sensitive capability
  • session-initno sensitive capability
  • session-logno sensitive capability
  • session-statsno sensitive capability
  • settings-preferences-getno sensitive capability
  • settings-preferences-updateno sensitive capability
  • settings-profileno sensitive capability
  • settings-supported-providersno sensitive capability
  • settings-usage-logsno sensitive capability
  • settings-usage-summaryno sensitive capability
  • share-createno sensitive capability
  • share-get-publicno sensitive capability
  • share-slug-statsno sensitive capability
  • share-statsno sensitive capability
  • upload-job-fileno sensitive capability
  • upload-resumeno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.3.2 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan llmconveyors-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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