Llm Cli Gateway MCP Server
llm-cli-gateway
npm
v3.2.0
Source verified
Published by verivus-oss — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Secure local control plane for AI coding agents across supported MCP clients, with workspace-scoped remote access, approval gates, durable jobs, sessions, and audit receipts.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/acp/process-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/acp/process-manager.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nodeSpawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/acp/process-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-updater.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-updater.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { executeCli, providerCommandName } from "./executor.js"; import { CLI_TY
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-updater.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/endpoint-exposure.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/endpoint-exposure.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; const TUNNEL_HOST_PATTERNS = [ /cloudflare/i, /trycloudflare\.com$/i,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/endpoint-exposure.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/executor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { homedir } from "os"; import { delimiter, join, dirname, extname, win32
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/job-replay-context.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/job-replay-context.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; const HASH_READ_CEILING_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; const CODEX_PROJECT_DOC_MAX_BYTES =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/job-replay-context.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/personal-config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/personal-config.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { constants as fsConstants, chmodSync, closeSync, existsSync, fstatSync,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/personal-config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/provider-capability-discovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/provider-capability-discovery.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { accessSync, constants as fsConstants, readFileSync, statSync } from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/provider-capability-discovery.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/provider-status.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/provider-status.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { CLI_TYPES } from "./provider-types.js"; import { getProviderLoginGuidan
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/provider-status.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/review-scope.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-scope.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { closeSync, constants as fsCon
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-scope.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sqlite-driver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sqlite-driver.js:102`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "); } } exec(sql) { this.guardReadOnly(sql); this.db.exec(sql); } prepare(sql) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sqlite-driver.js
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ask_modelno sensitive capabilitycompare_answersno sensitive capabilityconsensus_checkno sensitive capabilityjob_resultno sensitive capabilityjob_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_available_modelsno sensitive capabilityprovider_admin_listno sensitive capabilityprovider_admin_mutateno sensitive capabilityprovider_admin_runno sensitive capabilityred_team_reviewno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
review_changesno sensitive capabilitysecond_opinionno sensitive capabilitysynthesize_validationno sensitive capabilityvalidate_with_modelsno sensitive capabilityvalidation_receiptno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.2.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v3.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan llm-cli-gateway --onlineMore in Developer Tools
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