Llamaventures Cli MCP Server
@llamaventures/cli
npm
v2.3.0
Source verified
Published by llama-ventures — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
CLI + MCP server for the Llama Ventures investment workbench (command.llamaventures.vc).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (lib/external.mjs)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`lib/external.mjs:328`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ".llama", ".aws", ".config/gcloud", ".gnupg", ".kube", ".docker", ]; function assertSafeUploadPath(filePath
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/external.mjs
high Tool "write_deal" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "write_deal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool write_deal
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/client.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/client.mjs:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: le as _execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { createHash, randomUUID } from "crypto
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/client.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/oauth-flow.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/oauth-flow.mjs:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; const CLIENT_ID = "llama-cli-official"; const REDIRECT_PATH = "/callback"; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/oauth-flow.mjs
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([agent_bootstrap]) co-exist with external-action tools ([write_deal, pitch_send_message, pitch_upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [agent_bootstrap] → sinks [write_deal, pitch_send_message, pitch_upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow agent_bootstrap → write_deal
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "write_deal"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "write_deal" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool write_deal · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "write_deal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_deal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_deal
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent_bootstrapingests untrusted inputpitch_send_messagenetwork egresspitch_upload_filenetwork egresswrite_dealruns code / shellauth_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_dealno sensitive capabilityget_deal_memoryno sensitive capabilityget_live_deal_page_schemano sensitive capabilityobject_inspectno sensitive capabilitypitch_finalizeno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
pitch_startno sensitive capabilitypitch_statusno sensitive capabilitypref_addno sensitive capabilitypref_listno sensitive capabilitypref_set_statusno sensitive capabilityread_dealno sensitive capabilitysearch_dealsno sensitive capabilityskills_readno sensitive capabilityskills_searchno sensitive capabilityupdate_deal_memoryno sensitive capabilitywiki_deleteno sensitive capabilitywiki_readno sensitive capabilitywiki_restoreno sensitive capabilitywiki_saveno sensitive capabilitywiki_searchno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.1.1 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.0.3 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v1.26.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.25.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v1.23.1 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v1.22.1 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v1.22.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v1.20.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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