Live Mcp For Obsidian — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "live-mcp-for-obsidian",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "live-mcp-for-obsidian"
},
"server": {
"name": "live-mcp-for-obsidian"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([obsidian_files]) and tools that can send data out ([obsidian_eval]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "obsidian_files → obsidian_eval"
},
"evidence": "sources [obsidian_files] → sinks [obsidian_eval]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"obsidian_files"
],
"sinks": [
"obsidian_eval"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"obsidian_eval\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"obsidian_eval\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "obsidian_eval"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/connection.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/connection.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/connection.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; const DEFAULT_OBSIDIAN_PATH = \"/Applications/Obsidian.app/Contents/MacOS/Obsidia",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/connection.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/recording.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/tools/recording.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/recording.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { mkdir, writeFile, rm } from \"node:fs/promises\"; import { join, resolve",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/recording.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"code\" on \"obsidian_eval\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"obsidian_eval\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"code\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "obsidian_eval",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.code"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "code"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"obsidian_eval\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"obsidian_eval\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "obsidian_eval"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"obsidian_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"obsidian_eval"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"obsidian_files",
"obsidian_eval"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: obsidian_files → obsidian_eval."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "obsidian_eval",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_dom",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_errors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_css",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_cdp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_debug",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_mobile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_devtools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_briefing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_properties",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_property_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_backlinks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_outline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_daily",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_daily_append",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_plugins",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_plugin_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_plugin_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_plugin_disable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_plugin_reload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_commands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_command",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_start_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_stop_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_vaults",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_theme",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_themes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_snippets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_append",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_prepend",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_tabs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "obsidian_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bf370efa3b77aedb06d2c9d66ca27b398ca2a2ad79c61d11da1fc973a8af96ec",
"stats": {
"tools": 46,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}