Linkedsword MCP Server
linkedsword-mcp
npm
v0.5.0
Published by yannyhl — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Roblox Studio MCP server: diff-reviewed script editing, planning mode, playtest automation, asset uploads.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "run_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_code
high Tool "run_script_in_play_mode" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script_in_play_mode" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script_in_play_mode
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_library, get_asset_details, get_plan]) co-exist with external-action tools ([run_code, run_script_in_play_mode]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_library, get_asset_details, get_plan] → sinks [run_code, run_script_in_play_mode]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_library → run_code
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2461`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res2 = await fetch("https://apis.roblox.com/assets/v1/assets", { method: "POST", headers: { "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "run_code"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_code" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_code · inputSchema.properties.code
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "run_script_in_play_mode"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_script_in_play_mode" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_script_in_play_mode · inputSchema.properties.code
low Mutating tool "run_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_code
low Mutating tool "run_script_in_play_mode" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script_in_play_mode" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script_in_play_mode
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install-plugin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install-plugin.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require("child_process"); // Try the bundled location first (npm install), then fall back to the dev //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/install-plugin.js
Tools 93
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_asset_detailsingests untrusted inputget_planingests untrusted inputlist_libraryingests untrusted inputrun_coderuns code / shellrun_script_in_play_moderuns code / shelladd_tagno sensitive capabilitybatch_operationsno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenshotno sensitive capabilitycharacter_navigationno sensitive capabilityclear_terrainno sensitive capability
Show 83 more tools ↓
clone_objectno sensitive capabilitycompare_instancesno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectno sensitive capabilitycreate_planno sensitive capabilitycreate_weldno sensitive capabilitydelete_attributeno sensitive capabilitydelete_checkpointno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitydelete_planno sensitive capabilitydelete_script_linesno sensitive capabilityedit_script_linesno sensitive capabilityexecute_luauno sensitive capabilityexport_buildno sensitive capabilityfill_terrainno sensitive capabilityget_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_asset_thumbnailno sensitive capabilityget_attributeno sensitive capabilityget_attributesno sensitive capabilityget_auto_accept_statusno sensitive capabilityget_bounding_boxno sensitive capabilityget_class_infono sensitive capabilityget_connected_instancesno sensitive capabilityget_console_outputno sensitive capabilityget_descendantsno sensitive capabilityget_diff_historyno sensitive capabilityget_diff_queueno sensitive capabilityget_file_treeno sensitive capabilityget_instance_childrenno sensitive capabilityget_instance_propertiesno sensitive capabilityget_place_infono sensitive capabilityget_playtest_outputno sensitive capabilityget_project_structureno sensitive capabilityget_script_sourceno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_servicesno sensitive capabilityget_stable_idno sensitive capabilityget_studio_modeno sensitive capabilityget_taggedno sensitive capabilityget_tagsno sensitive capabilitygrep_replaceno sensitive capabilitygrep_scriptsno sensitive capabilitygroup_objectsno sensitive capabilityimport_buildno sensitive capabilityinsert_modelno sensitive capabilityinsert_script_linesno sensitive capabilitylist_plansno sensitive capabilitylist_roblox_studiosno sensitive capabilitymass_create_objectsno sensitive capabilitymass_duplicateno sensitive capabilitymass_get_propertyno sensitive capabilitymass_set_propertyno sensitive capabilityparallel_searchno sensitive capabilitypatch_scriptno sensitive capabilityraycastno sensitive capabilityredono sensitive capabilityremove_tagno sensitive capabilityreparent_objectno sensitive capabilityresolve_diffno sensitive capabilityresolve_stable_idno sensitive capabilityrevert_to_checkpointno sensitive capabilityrollbackno sensitive capabilityrun_playtest_scenariono sensitive capabilitysearch_assetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_by_propertyno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_objectsno sensitive capabilityset_active_studiono sensitive capabilityset_attributeno sensitive capabilityset_auto_acceptno sensitive capabilityset_calculated_propertyno sensitive capabilityset_modeno sensitive capabilityset_propertyno sensitive capabilityset_script_sourceno sensitive capabilityset_selectionno sensitive capabilitysmart_duplicateno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_checkpointno sensitive capabilitystart_playtestno sensitive capabilitystop_playtestno sensitive capabilityungroup_objectsno sensitive capabilityupdate_plan_stepno sensitive capabilityupload_assetno sensitive capabilityuser_keyboard_inputno sensitive capabilityuser_mouse_inputno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (93 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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