Line Oa Mcp Ultimate MCP Server
line-oa-mcp-ultimate
npm
v2.2.2
Source verified
Published by wasintoh — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Operate one or many LINE Official Accounts from any AI agent through natural language — messaging and commerce, no code. Messaging: broadcasts, Flex messages, rich menus, audiences, coupons, and insights. New in 2.1 — Rich Menu Studio: generate profession
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/imagehost/providers/local-tunnel.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/imagehost/providers/local-tunnel.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; import { Resolver } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/imagehost/providers/local-tunnel.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([line_get_message_stats, line_get_order, line_get_user_profile]) co-exist with external-action tools ([line_build_audience_from_engagement, line_design_card, line_design_flex, line_design_imagemap, line_estimate_send_cost, line_find_sticker, line_get_coupon_stats, line_get_message_stats, line_list_orders, line_manage_coupon, line_send_message, line_set_webhook_endpoint, line_test_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [line_get_message_stats, line_get_order, line_get_user_profile] → sinks [line_build_audience_from_engagement, line_design_card, line_design_flex, line
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow line_get_message_stats → line_build_audience_from_engagement
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
line_get_message_statsingests untrusted inputnetwork egressline_build_audience_from_engagementnetwork egressline_design_cardnetwork egressline_design_flexnetwork egressline_design_imagemapnetwork egressline_estimate_send_costnetwork egressline_find_stickernetwork egressline_get_coupon_statsnetwork egressline_get_orderingests untrusted inputline_get_user_profileingests untrusted input
Show 41 more tools ↓
line_list_ordersnetwork egressline_manage_couponnetwork egressline_send_messagenetwork egressline_set_webhook_endpointnetwork egressline_test_webhooknetwork egressline_audit_user_menuno sensitive capabilityline_build_audience_from_csvno sensitive capabilityline_build_rich_menuno sensitive capabilityline_cancel_orderno sensitive capabilityline_check_tokenno sensitive capabilityline_create_checkout_linkno sensitive capabilityline_create_productno sensitive capabilityline_delete_audienceno sensitive capabilityline_delete_productno sensitive capabilityline_delete_rich_menuno sensitive capabilityline_design_rich_menu_imageno sensitive capabilityline_fulfill_orderno sensitive capabilityline_get_narrowcast_progressno sensitive capabilityline_get_oa_reportno sensitive capabilityline_get_oa_statusno sensitive capabilityline_get_settlementno sensitive capabilityline_image_host_statusno sensitive capabilityline_link_rich_menuno sensitive capabilityline_list_audiencesno sensitive capabilityline_list_followersno sensitive capabilityline_list_oasno sensitive capabilityline_list_productsno sensitive capabilityline_list_rich_menusno sensitive capabilityline_manage_inventoryno sensitive capabilityline_manage_liff_appno sensitive capabilityline_manage_product_variantno sensitive capabilityline_manage_rich_menu_aliasno sensitive capabilityline_prepare_imageno sensitive capabilityline_run_on_many_oasno sensitive capabilityline_set_default_rich_menuno sensitive capabilityline_set_product_visibilityno sensitive capabilityline_update_audienceno sensitive capabilityline_update_productno sensitive capabilityline_update_product_priceno sensitive capabilityline_upload_rich_menu_imageno sensitive capabilityline_use_oano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.2.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v2.1.0 |
A 97/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v2.0.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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