Lilbee MCP Server
lilbee
PyPI
v0.6.90b434
Published by tobocop2 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The whole local AI stack in one executable: run and manage local AI models across every GPU you have, and search your files, code, and the web pages you crawl, with answers that cite the source. Per-project libraries, semantic and hybrid search, vision OCR, an auto-built wiki, CLI, TUI, MCP server, REST API, and Python library. No model server, no database server, no containers. Works with your own Ollama or LM Studio models too.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/lilbee/lib/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/lilbee/lib/cli.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/lilbee/lib/cli.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/lilbee/lib/detect.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/lilbee/lib/detect.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import { promisify } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/lilbee/lib/detect.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/lilbee/test-fixtures/child-tree.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/lilbee/test-fixtures/child-tree.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const grand = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", "setInterval(() => {}, 60000)"], {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/lilbee/test-fixtures/child-tree.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lilbee/__main__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lilbee/__main__.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return False exec( # noqa: S102 payload is emitted by Python's own stdlib into sys.executable compi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lilbee/__main__.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (packages/lilbee/test/lifetime.test.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`packages/lilbee/test/lifetime.test.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { once } from "node:events"; import path from "node:path"; import { fileU
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/lilbee/test/lifetime.test.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (packages/lilbee/test/quiet.test.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`packages/lilbee/test/quiet.test.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/lilbee/test/quiet.test.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check_style_rules.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check_style_rules.py:353`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["git", "merge-base", "HEAD", branch], cwd=REPO_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check_style_rules.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/qa/cli_surface_qa.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/qa/cli_surface_qa.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run([CLI, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout) def _traceback(c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/qa/cli_surface_qa.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/qa/placement_qa.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/qa/placement_qa.py:175`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( [_LILBEE_BIN, *args], input=stdin, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/qa/placement_qa.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/qa/tui_nav_eval.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/qa/tui_nav_eval.py:597`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s[2] baseline_sha = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--short", args.baseline], cwd=repo,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/qa/tui_nav_eval.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.90b434 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v0.6.90b433 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.6.90b432 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.6.90b430 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.6.90b428 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.6.90b427 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v0.6.90b426 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.6.90b425 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.6.90b424 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.6.90b423 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan lilbee --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
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