lightning-wallet-mcp
npm
v1.5.3
Published by lightningfaucet — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Lightning wallet for AI agents. MCP server + CLI. Works with Claude Code, OpenClaw, Cursor, and any agent framework.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Untrusted-input tools ([board_read]) co-exist with external-action tools ([register_webhook, delete_webhook, test_webhook, nostr_zap]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [board_read] → sinks [register_webhook, delete_webhook, test_webhook, nostr_zap]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow board_read → register_webhook
Tool "register_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
board_readingests untrusted inputdelete_webhooknetwork egressnostr_zapnetwork egressregister_webhooknetwork egresstest_webhooknetwork egressboard_postno sensitive capabilityboard_replyno sensitive capabilityboard_voteno sensitive capabilitycheck_balanceno sensitive capabilityclaim_lnurl_withdrawno sensitive capabilityclaim_promono sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_invoiceno sensitive capabilitycreate_withdraw_linkno sensitive capabilitydeactivate_agentno sensitive capabilitydecode_invoiceno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilityfund_agentno sensitive capabilityget_budget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_deposit_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_infono sensitive capabilityget_invoice_statusno sensitive capabilityget_nostr_identityno sensitive capabilityget_rate_limitsno sensitive capabilityget_transactionsno sensitive capabilitykeysendno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitylnurl_authno sensitive capabilitypay_invoiceno sensitive capabilitypay_l402_apino sensitive capabilitypay_lightning_addressno sensitive capabilityreactivate_agentno sensitive capabilityrecover_accountno sensitive capabilityregister_operatorno sensitive capabilityrotate_api_keyno sensitive capabilityset_agent_credentialsno sensitive capabilityset_budgetno sensitive capabilityset_nostr_identityno sensitive capabilityset_operator_keyno sensitive capabilitysweep_agentno sensitive capabilitytransfer_to_agentno sensitive capabilityupdate_operatorno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capabilitywithdrawno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.3 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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