Lightning Enable MCP Server
lightning-enable-mcp
PyPI
v1.24.1
Published by refined-element — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Part of Lightning Enable — infrastructure for agent commerce over Lightning. MCP server for L402 Lightning payments, API discovery, and agent commerce.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lightning_enable_mcp/config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lightning_enable_mcp/config.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: setup. result = subprocess.run( ["icacls", str(path), "/inheritance:r", "/grant", f"{user}:F"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lightning_enable_mcp/config.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_l402_client.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_l402_client.py:412`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: await self.client.fetch( "https://original.example.com/data", headers={"X-Api-Key"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_l402_client.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mpp_draft00.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mpp_draft00.py:458`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: receipt = await client.fetch( "https://api.provider.com/premium", max_sats=1000 )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mpp_draft00.py
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
access_l402_resourceno sensitive capabilitycheck_invoice_statusno sensitive capabilityconfigure_budgetno sensitive capabilitycreate_invoiceno sensitive capabilitycreate_l402_challengeno sensitive capabilitycreate_lightning_enable_accountno sensitive capabilitydiscover_agent_servicesno sensitive capabilitydiscover_apino sensitive capabilityexchange_currencyno sensitive capabilityget_agent_reputationno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
get_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_btc_priceno sensitive capabilityget_budget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_payment_historyno sensitive capabilityget_receiptsno sensitive capabilitypay_invoiceno sensitive capabilitypay_l402_challengeno sensitive capabilitypublish_agent_attestationno sensitive capabilitypublish_agent_capabilityno sensitive capabilityrequest_agent_serviceno sensitive capabilitysend_onchainno sensitive capabilitysettle_agent_serviceno sensitive capabilitytest_l402_paymentno sensitive capabilityunpublish_agent_capabilityno sensitive capabilityverify_confirmation_codeno sensitive capabilityverify_l402_paymentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.24.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v1.24.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.23.3 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v1.23.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v1.22.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.21.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.21.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v1.20.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v1.19.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v1.16.2 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan lightning-enable-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.