Lightbulb MCP Server

lightbulb-mcp PyPI v0.23.0

Published by rpasquale — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for the Lightbulb Partners Agents platform — Claude Code, Codex, and Cursor integration

Trust grade
B
89/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 89/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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B Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 89/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 8

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: backbone_execute → get_agent_marketplace_action_publication → create_account_shell_customization_draft. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow backbone_execute → get_agent_marketplace_action_publication → create_account_shell_customization_draft

high Tool "get_account_shell_customization" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "get_account_shell_customization" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool get_account_shell_customization

high Tool "create_account_shell_customization_draft" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "create_account_shell_customization_draft" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool create_account_shell_customization_draft

high Tool "preview_account_shell_customization" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "preview_account_shell_customization" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool preview_account_shell_customization

high Shell/command execution in server code (lightbulb/context_hook.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`lightbulb/context_hook.py:564`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", cwd, *args], capture_output=True,

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server lightbulb/context_hook.py

low Mutating tool "get_account_shell_customization" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "get_account_shell_customization" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool get_account_shell_customization

low Mutating tool "create_account_shell_customization_draft" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "create_account_shell_customization_draft" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool create_account_shell_customization_draft

low Mutating tool "preview_account_shell_customization" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "preview_account_shell_customization" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool preview_account_shell_customization

Tools 200

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • backbone_executeingests untrusted input
  • create_account_shell_customization_draftruns code / shell
  • get_account_shell_customizationruns code / shell
  • get_agent_marketplace_action_publicationreads sensitive data
  • get_project_game_snapshotingests untrusted input
  • list_folderingests untrusted input
  • preflight_agent_training_pairnetwork egress
  • preview_account_shell_customizationruns code / shell
  • activate_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • admit_project_learning_runno sensitive capability
Show 190 more tools ↓
  • advance_service_case_resolutionno sensitive capability
  • archive_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • ask_document_agentno sensitive capability
  • attach_contract_to_cash_cash_collectedno sensitive capability
  • attach_contract_to_cash_invoice_issuedno sensitive capability
  • author_agentic_workflowno sensitive capability
  • author_workflow_triggerno sensitive capability
  • bind_project_mission_actionno sensitive capability
  • business_classify_replyno sensitive capability
  • business_create_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • business_draft_contractno sensitive capability
  • business_review_contractno sensitive capability
  • business_schedule_meetingno sensitive capability
  • business_write_emailno sensitive capability
  • cancel_codex_account_linkno sensitive capability
  • cancel_contract_to_cash_before_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • cancel_governed_communication_runno sensitive capability
  • cancel_operating_loopno sensitive capability
  • cancel_recursive_agent_executionno sensitive capability
  • cancel_service_case_resolutionno sensitive capability
  • cancel_workflow_runno sensitive capability
  • code_workspace_chatno sensitive capability
  • code_workspace_get_active_runno sensitive capability
  • code_workspace_get_runno sensitive capability
  • code_workspace_wait_for_runno sensitive capability
  • company_bring_upno sensitive capability
  • company_chaosno sensitive capability
  • company_closureno sensitive capability
  • company_demand_budgetno sensitive capability
  • company_employeesno sensitive capability
  • company_exception_casesno sensitive capability
  • company_jobsno sensitive capability
  • company_launchno sensitive capability
  • company_obligationsno sensitive capability
  • company_payablesno sensitive capability
  • company_people_opsno sensitive capability
  • company_portfoliono sensitive capability
  • company_provisioningno sensitive capability
  • company_renewalsno sensitive capability
  • company_revenueno sensitive capability
  • company_wind_downno sensitive capability
  • compose_business_workflowno sensitive capability
  • configure_backbone_agent_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • configure_coding_agent_runtimeno sensitive capability
  • create_documentno sensitive capability
  • create_project_from_preflightno sensitive capability
  • create_slide_deckno sensitive capability
  • create_spreadsheetno sensitive capability
  • decide_project_learning_result_admissionno sensitive capability
  • decide_workflow_improvement_packetno sensitive capability
  • describe_anatomyno sensitive capability
  • describe_operating_loopno sensitive capability
  • dispatch_domain_agentno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_attachno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_cancelno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_next_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_startno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_statusno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_submit_builder_resultno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_submit_evaluator_verdictno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_workflow_submit_planno sensitive capability
  • evaluate_project_offline_policyno sensitive capability
  • execute_contract_to_cash_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • find_operating_loopsno sensitive capability
  • flush_sdk_runtime_outcomesno sensitive capability
  • get_agent_marketplace_installationno sensitive capability
  • get_agent_marketplace_invocation_receiptno sensitive capability
  • get_agent_marketplace_invocation_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_agent_marketplace_listingno sensitive capability
  • get_agent_runtime_configno sensitive capability
  • get_agent_training_pair_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_approval_detailsno sensitive capability
  • get_artifactno sensitive capability
  • get_codex_account_link_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_contract_to_cash_cash_collectionno sensitive capability
  • get_contract_to_cash_invoice_issuedno sensitive capability
  • get_contract_to_cash_runno sensitive capability
  • get_engine_inventoryno sensitive capability
  • get_executed_commercial_agreementno sensitive capability
  • get_golden_loop_economic_closureno sensitive capability
  • get_governed_communication_runno sensitive capability
  • get_operating_loop_evidenceno sensitive capability
  • get_operating_loop_next_actionno sensitive capability
  • get_operating_loop_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_project_work_packet_runno sensitive capability
  • get_recursive_agent_execution_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_runtime_domain_actionno sensitive capability
  • get_server_workflow_improvement_packetno sensitive capability
  • get_server_workflow_improvement_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_service_case_resolutionno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_improvement_auditno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_improvement_deliveryno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_improvement_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_runno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_trigger_catalogno sensitive capability
  • grep_documentsno sensitive capability
  • inspect_agent_learning_readinessno sensitive capability
  • inspect_agent_training_input_custodyno sensitive capability
  • inspect_project_creation_world_readyno sensitive capability
  • inspect_project_game_campaignno sensitive capability
  • install_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • invoke_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • invoke_toolno sensitive capability
  • list_agent_marketplace_installationsno sensitive capability
  • list_agent_marketplace_listingsno sensitive capability
  • list_agent_runtime_optionsno sensitive capability
  • list_artifactsno sensitive capability
  • list_code_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • list_connectorsno sensitive capability
  • list_crm_contactsno sensitive capability
  • list_crm_dealsno sensitive capability
  • list_engine_statesno sensitive capability
  • list_governed_communication_sourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_notificationsno sensitive capability
  • list_pending_approvalsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_business_outcomesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_learning_result_evaluationsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_learning_reviewsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_learning_runsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_mission_runsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_policy_assignmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_policy_evaluationsno sensitive capability
  • list_project_science_evidenceno sensitive capability
  • list_project_shadow_learner_updatesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_skill_matchesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_training_packsno sensitive capability
  • list_runtime_domain_actionsno sensitive capability
  • list_sdk_runtime_outcomesno sensitive capability
  • list_server_workflow_improvement_packetsno sensitive capability
  • list_workflow_improvement_packetsno sensitive capability
  • list_workflowsno sensitive capability
  • manage_sdk_project_runtimeno sensitive capability
  • new_recursive_execution_idno sensitive capability
  • page_builder_chatno sensitive capability
  • page_builder_createno sensitive capability
  • page_builder_deployno sensitive capability
  • page_builder_list_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • page_builder_previewno sensitive capability
  • pin_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • preflight_project_creationno sensitive capability
  • prepare_project_learning_runno sensitive capability
  • prepare_workflow_learning_handoffno sensitive capability
  • preview_agent_marketplace_action_publicationno sensitive capability
  • propose_contract_to_cash_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • publish_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • rag_queryno sensitive capability
  • rag_uploadno sensitive capability
  • record_project_business_outcomeno sensitive capability
  • record_project_learning_reviewno sensitive capability
  • record_project_policy_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • record_project_science_evidenceno sensitive capability
  • record_workflow_improvement_delivery_eventno sensitive capability
  • recursive_agent_executeno sensitive capability
  • refine_project_creation_preflightno sensitive capability
  • register_contract_to_cash_cash_collectionno sensitive capability
  • register_contract_to_cash_invoice_issuedno sensitive capability
  • register_executed_commercial_agreementno sensitive capability
  • register_external_artifactno sensitive capability
  • register_runtime_domain_actionno sensitive capability
  • request_agent_training_pair_admissionno sensitive capability
  • resolve_executed_commercial_agreementno sensitive capability
  • run_business_primitiveno sensitive capability
  • run_connector_conformanceno sensitive capability
  • run_sdk_business_primitiveno sensitive capability
  • run_sdk_project_workflowno sensitive capability
  • run_workflowno sensitive capability
  • run_workflow_improvement_cycleno sensitive capability
  • search_agent_marketplaceno sensitive capability
  • search_documentsno sensitive capability
  • search_folderno sensitive capability
  • software_delivery_contextno sensitive capability
  • software_delivery_loopno sensitive capability
  • software_spot_weld_fixno sensitive capability
  • start_codex_account_linkno sensitive capability
  • start_consulting_project_workflowno sensitive capability
  • start_contract_to_cash_runno sensitive capability
  • start_governed_communication_runno sensitive capability
  • start_operating_loopno sensitive capability
  • start_project_mission_runno sensitive capability
  • start_project_work_packetno sensitive capability
  • start_service_case_resolutionno sensitive capability
  • start_workflow_improvement_deliveryno sensitive capability
  • submit_project_creation_preflight_feedbackno sensitive capability
  • sync_workflow_improvement_reportno sensitive capability
  • test_agent_runtime_configno sensitive capability
  • trigger_workflowno sensitive capability
  • uninstall_agent_marketplace_actionno sensitive capability
  • validate_sdk_projectno sensitive capability
  • what_can_you_dono sensitive capability
  • where_isno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 4

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.23.0 latest B 89/100 8 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v0.22.0 B 89/100 8 1.13.0 2026-09-05
v0.20.0 B 89/100 8 1.13.0 2026-09-04
v0.8.0 A 93/100 7 1.13.0 2026-08-25

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MCP Trust Score: B · 89/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan lightbulb-mcp --online --registry pypi

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