Lichess (npm) MCP Server
lichess-mcp
npm
v1.1.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Lichess MCP server for Claude Code and Claude Desktop
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "lichess_cloud_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "lichess_cloud_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool lichess_cloud_eval
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([lichess_get_my_games]) co-exist with external-action tools ([lichess_cloud_eval]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [lichess_get_my_games] → sinks [lichess_cloud_eval]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow lichess_get_my_games → lichess_cloud_eval
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:61`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const res = await fetch("https://lichess.org/api/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Typ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/auth.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/auth.ts:70`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ); const res = await fetch("https://lichess.org/api/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "app
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/auth.ts
low Mutating tool "lichess_cloud_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lichess_cloud_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lichess_cloud_eval
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
lichess_cloud_evalruns code / shelllichess_get_my_gamesingests untrusted inputlichess_abortno sensitive capabilitylichess_accept_challengeno sensitive capabilitylichess_auth_startno sensitive capabilitylichess_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitylichess_cancel_challengeno sensitive capabilitylichess_challenge_aino sensitive capabilitylichess_create_challengeno sensitive capabilitylichess_decline_challengeno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
lichess_get_crosstableno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_daily_puzzleno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_leaderboardno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_my_profileno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_next_puzzleno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_ongoing_gamesno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_puzzleno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_puzzle_activityno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_rating_historyno sensitive capabilitylichess_get_userno sensitive capabilitylichess_list_challengesno sensitive capabilitylichess_make_moveno sensitive capabilitylichess_offer_drawno sensitive capabilitylichess_resignno sensitive capabilitylichess_send_chatno sensitive capabilitylichess_stream_eventsno sensitive capabilitylichess_stream_gameno sensitive capabilitylichess_takebackno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan lichess-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Lichess 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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