Levh MCP Server
levh
PyPI
v2.27.2
Published by ali-ulu — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first memory layer for AI agents and humans
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli.py:507`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: top = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], capture_outpu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dashboard/_next/static/chunks/main-6231b573fad16866.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dashboard/_next/static/chunks/main-6231b573fad16866.js:1`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bitArray:this.bitArray}}import(e){this.numItems=e.numItems,this.errorRate=e.errorRate,this.numBits=e.numBits,this.numHas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dashboard/_next/static/chunks/main-6231b573fad16866.js
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
about_entityno sensitive capabilityabout_organizationno sensitive capabilityabout_personno sensitive capabilityadmit_memoryno sensitive capabilityask_memoryno sensitive capabilityaudit_secretsno sensitive capabilitybriefingno sensitive capabilityclear_short_termno sensitive capabilityconnector_sync_statusno sensitive capabilityconsolidate_memoriesno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
consolidate_similarno sensitive capabilitycreate_backupno sensitive capabilitycreate_sessionno sensitive capabilitydedupe_memoriesno sensitive capabilitydetect_conflict_candidatesno sensitive capabilityend_sessionno sensitive capabilityevaluate_admissionno sensitive capabilityexport_memoriesno sensitive capabilityforget_memoryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_context_fileno sensitive capabilityget_connector_helpno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_memory_statsno sensitive capabilityimport_from_appno sensitive capabilityimport_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_conflict_candidatesno sensitive capabilitylist_connectorsno sensitive capabilitylist_decisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_entitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_fading_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_low_trust_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_organizationsno sensitive capabilitylist_peopleno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_review_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_sourcesno sensitive capabilitymeeting_prepno sensitive capabilitymemory_feedbackno sensitive capabilitymemory_trustno sensitive capabilitypin_memoryno sensitive capabilitypurge_memoryno sensitive capabilityrecall_memoryno sensitive capabilityrecompute_trust_scoresno sensitive capabilityredact_secretsno sensitive capabilityreindex_entitiesno sensitive capabilityreinforce_memoryno sensitive capabilityrelated_memoriesno sensitive capabilityrestore_backupno sensitive capabilityreview_conflict_candidateno sensitive capabilityreview_memoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoryno sensitive capabilityset_importanceno sensitive capabilitystore_memoryno sensitive capabilitysummarize_sessionno sensitive capabilitysync_connectorno sensitive capabilitytimelineno sensitive capabilityunpin_memoryno sensitive capabilityupdate_memoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.27.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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