Flow (lemoncloud) MCP Server
@lemoncloud/flow-mcp
npm
v1.6.0
Published by @lemoncloud — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/open-browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/open-browser.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: er = void 0; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); /** * Open a URL in the user's default browser
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/open-browser.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
block_getno sensitive capabilityblock_listno sensitive capabilitycredit_balanceno sensitive capabilitycredit_historyno sensitive capabilitycredit_packsno sensitive capabilitycredit_purchaseno sensitive capabilityedge_createno sensitive capabilityedge_deleteno sensitive capabilityflow_cloneno sensitive capabilityflow_createno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
flow_exportno sensitive capabilityflow_graphno sensitive capabilityflow_listno sensitive capabilityflow_loadno sensitive capabilityflow_publishno sensitive capabilityflow_runno sensitive capabilityflow_run_fromno sensitive capabilityflow_saveno sensitive capabilityflow_updateno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilitynode_createno sensitive capabilitynode_deleteno sensitive capabilitynode_getno sensitive capabilitynode_get_portno sensitive capabilitynode_runno sensitive capabilitynode_updateno sensitive capabilityprofile_getno sensitive capabilityrun_getno sensitive capabilityrun_listno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @lemoncloud/flow-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Flow 3
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