Confluence Data Center MCP Server
@leilashellroot/confluence-data-center-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Source verified
Published by leilashellroot — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| ✓ | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([confluence_get_all_comments]) co-exist with external-action tools ([confluence_create_comment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [confluence_get_all_comments] → sinks [confluence_create_comment]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow confluence_get_all_comments → confluence_create_comment
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
confluence_create_commentnetwork egressconfluence_get_all_commentsingests untrusted inputconfluence_add_attachmentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_add_labelsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_archive_spaceno sensitive capabilityconfluence_create_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_create_content_propertyno sensitive capabilityconfluence_create_spaceno sensitive capabilityconfluence_createContentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_delete_attachmentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_delete_commentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_delete_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_delete_content_propertyno sensitive capabilityconfluence_delete_content_versionno sensitive capabilityconfluence_delete_spaceno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_attachmentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_childrenno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_commentsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_content_contextno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_content_propertiesno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_content_propertyno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_content_versionno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_current_userno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_descendantsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_historyno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_labelsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_restrictionsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_spaceno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_space_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_spacesno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_userno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_usersno sensitive capabilityconfluence_get_watchersno sensitive capabilityconfluence_getContentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_remove_labelno sensitive capabilityconfluence_scan_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_search_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_search_spacesno sensitive capabilityconfluence_searchContentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_searchSpaceno sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_attachmentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_attachment_datano sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_commentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_contentno sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_content_propertyno sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_restrictionsno sensitive capabilityconfluence_update_spaceno sensitive capabilityconfluence_updateContentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 90/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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