Cross Review V1 MCP Server
@lcv-ideas-software/cross-review-v1
npm
v1.12.11
Source verified
Published by lcv-ideas-software — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/deepseek-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/deepseek-cli.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync } = require("node:child_process"); const { Client } = require("@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/deepseek-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/caller-tokens.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/caller-tokens.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require("node:child_process"); const TOKEN_BYTES = 32; // 256-bit secret per agent. const TOKEN_HEX_LENGTH =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/caller-tokens.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/peer-spawn.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/peer-spawn.js:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = require("node:child_process"); const fs = require("node:fs"); const path = require("node:path"); const os = re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/peer-spawn.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/session-store.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/session-store.js:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = require("node:child_process"); const out = execSync(`tasklist /fi "PID eq ${pid}" /nh /fo csv`, { stdio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/session-store.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:1107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: escription: `N-ary peer spawn (spec v4.11 + tribunal model v1.8.0): deliberate with all complements of the session's cal
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/lib/session-store.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/session-store.js:104`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ocess"); const out = execSync(`tasklist /fi "PID eq ${pid}" /nh /fo csv`, { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/session-store.js
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ask_peersno sensitive capabilityescalate_to_operatorno sensitive capabilityregenerate_caller_tokensno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilitysession_attach_evidenceno sensitive capabilitysession_check_convergenceno sensitive capabilitysession_finalizeno sensitive capabilitysession_initno sensitive capabilitysession_readno sensitive capabilitysession_sweepno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.12.11 latest |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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