Latexmk — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "latexmk-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "latexmk-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "latexmk-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([latexmk_read_config]) and tools that can send data out ([latexmk_compile, latexmk_write_config]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "latexmk_read_config → latexmk_compile"
},
"evidence": "sources [latexmk_read_config] → sinks [latexmk_compile, latexmk_write_config]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"latexmk_read_config"
],
"sinks": [
"latexmk_compile",
"latexmk_write_config"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"latexmk_compile\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_compile\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_compile"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"latexmk_write_config\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_write_config\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_write_config"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/handlers.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/handlers.js"
},
"evidence": "execFile, spawn } from \"child_process\"; import * as fs from \"fs/promises\"; import * as os from \"os\"; import * as path fr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/handlers.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"shell_escape\" on \"latexmk_compile\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_compile\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"shell_escape\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_compile",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.shell_escape"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "shell_escape"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"shell_escape\" on \"latexmk_write_config\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_write_config\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"shell_escape\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_write_config",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.shell_escape"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "shell_escape"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"latexmk_compile\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_compile\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_compile"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"latexmk_write_config\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_write_config\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_write_config"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"working_dir\" on \"latexmk_read_config\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"latexmk_read_config\" takes a path parameter \"working_dir\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "latexmk_read_config",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.working_dir"
},
"data": {
"param": "working_dir"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"latexmk-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "latexmk-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"latexmk_read_config"
],
"externalSink": [
"latexmk_compile",
"latexmk_write_config"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"latexmk_read_config",
"latexmk_compile"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: latexmk_read_config → latexmk_compile."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "latexmk_compile",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_draft_compile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_clean",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_list_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_watch_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_watch_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_watch_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_write_config",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_read_config",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_config\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "latexmk_list_citations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "625741f9581335b1e1aa9e5c9b78844c64ad03b26d42637a1a8b78e0ffea7de0",
"stats": {
"tools": 11,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 2,
"low": 3,
"info": 1
}
}
}