Electron (laststance) MCP Server
@laststance/electron-mcp-server
npm
v2.0.1
Source verified
Published by laststance — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Electron application automation and management. See MCP_USAGE_GUIDE.md for proper argument structure examples.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "electron_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "electron_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool electron_eval
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:6535`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s truthy. operationType=eval (validated). Default 5000ms, polled every 100ms.', schema: wait_for_function_schema,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2481`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } } ;// external "child_process" const external_child_process_namespaceObject = require("child_process"); ;// exte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([electron_get_page_structure]) co-exist with external-action tools ([electron_eval]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [electron_get_page_structure] → sinks [electron_eval]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow electron_get_page_structure → electron_eval
low Mutating tool "electron_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "electron_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool electron_eval
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
electron_evalruns code / shellelectron_get_page_structureingests untrusted inputelectron_clear_storageno sensitive capabilityelectron_click_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_click_by_textno sensitive capabilityelectron_console_logno sensitive capabilityelectron_debug_elementsno sensitive capabilityelectron_double_click_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_drag_from_tono sensitive capabilityelectron_fill_inputno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
electron_find_elementsno sensitive capabilityelectron_get_body_textno sensitive capabilityelectron_get_scroll_positionno sensitive capabilityelectron_get_titleno sensitive capabilityelectron_get_urlno sensitive capabilityelectron_get_viewport_sizeno sensitive capabilityelectron_hover_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_hover_by_textno sensitive capabilityelectron_local_storage_get_itemno sensitive capabilityelectron_local_storage_set_itemno sensitive capabilityelectron_navigate_to_hashno sensitive capabilityelectron_press_keyno sensitive capabilityelectron_query_attribute_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_query_enabled_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_query_text_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_query_value_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_query_visible_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_right_click_by_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_scroll_by_pixelsno sensitive capabilityelectron_scroll_to_elementno sensitive capabilityelectron_select_optionno sensitive capabilityelectron_send_keyboard_shortcutno sensitive capabilityelectron_session_storage_get_itemno sensitive capabilityelectron_session_storage_set_itemno sensitive capabilityelectron_verify_form_stateno sensitive capabilityelectron_wait_for_functionno sensitive capabilityelectron_wait_for_load_stateno sensitive capabilityelectron_wait_for_navigationno sensitive capabilityelectron_wait_for_selectorno sensitive capabilityelectron_wait_for_textno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @laststance/electron-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Electron 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
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