Langflow Builder MCP Server
langflow-builder-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.5
Published by sportsrecruits — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for building and modifying Langflow flows via LLM agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/langflow_builder_mcp/source_repo.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/langflow_builder_mcp/source_repo.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st(args) return subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=cwd or self.repo_dir, capture_outpu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/langflow_builder_mcp/source_repo.py
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_flowsingests untrusted inputlist_langflow_directoryreads sensitive dataadd_custom_componentno sensitive capabilityadd_nodeno sensitive capabilityadd_noteno sensitive capabilityanalyze_flow_layoutno sensitive capabilityauto_arrange_flowno sensitive capabilitybuild_flowno sensitive capabilitybuild_nodeno sensitive capabilityconnect_nodesno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
create_flowno sensitive capabilitydelete_flowno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_nodesno sensitive capabilityduplicate_flowno sensitive capabilityexplore_langflowno sensitive capabilityfind_compatible_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_build_statusno sensitive capabilityget_component_schemano sensitive capabilityget_flowno sensitive capabilityget_layout_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityget_node_detailsno sensitive capabilitylangflow_conceptsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_flowsno sensitive capabilitylist_component_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_componentsno sensitive capabilitylist_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_nodesno sensitive capabilitymove_nodeno sensitive capabilitymove_nodes_batchno sensitive capabilityread_langflow_fileno sensitive capabilityremove_nodeno sensitive capabilitysearch_componentsno sensitive capabilityset_tool_modeno sensitive capabilitysetup_langflow_sourceno sensitive capabilityupdate_nodeno sensitive capabilityupdate_noteno sensitive capabilityvalidate_connectionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan langflow-builder-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
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