Lablink MCP Server
lablink-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.0
Published by techmanual-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for direct AI agent control of lab devices — VISA/SCPI instruments, SSH hosts, REST APIs, serial devices, and Python environments
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Tool "python_shell_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "python_shell_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool python_shell_exec
high Tool "python_shell_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "python_shell_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool python_shell_eval
high Tool "ssh_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec
high Tool "ssh_shell_session" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_shell_session" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_shell_session
high Dynamic code execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py:91`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "") exec(compile(code, "<python_shell>", "exec"), namespace) # noqa: S102 elif op =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "") exec(compile(code, "<python_shell>", "exec"), namespace) # noqa: S102 elif op =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/driver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/driver.py:127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( [config.python_path, "-u", str(_BOOTSTRAP_PATH)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/driver.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/visa/driver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/visa/driver.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=5).returncode == 0 except Exception:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/visa/driver.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/interfaces/test_ssh.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/interfaces/test_ssh.py:168`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: key_path="/home/pi/.ssh/id_rsa", ) with patch("paramiko.SSHClient", return_value=client): d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/interfaces/test_ssh.py
low Mutating tool "python_shell_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "python_shell_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool python_shell_exec
low Mutating tool "python_shell_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "python_shell_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool python_shell_eval
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec
low Mutating tool "ssh_shell_session" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_shell_session" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_shell_session
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/interfaces/test_python_shell.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/interfaces/test_python_shell.py:728`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: trap.py" return subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-u", str(bootstrap)], stdin=subproce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/interfaces/test_python_shell.py
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
python_shell_evalruns code / shellpython_shell_execruns code / shellssh_execruns code / shellssh_shell_sessionruns code / shellconnectno sensitive capabilitydiagnoseno sensitive capabilitydisconnectno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilityrest_deleteno sensitive capabilityrest_getno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
rest_patchno sensitive capabilityrest_postno sensitive capabilityrest_putno sensitive capabilityserial_flushno sensitive capabilityserial_queryno sensitive capabilityserial_readno sensitive capabilityserial_writeno sensitive capabilityssh_read_streamno sensitive capabilityssh_start_streamno sensitive capabilityssh_stop_streamno sensitive capabilityvisa_queryno sensitive capabilityvisa_writeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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