Lablink MCP Server
lablink-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.0
Published by techmanual-ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 17.5 = 83. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 83 − 11 = 72. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 20
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/interfaces/test_ssh.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`tests/interfaces/test_ssh.py:168`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/interfaces/test_ssh.py
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py:94`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py
high Tool "python_shell_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "python_shell_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool python_shell_exec
high Tool "python_shell_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "python_shell_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool python_shell_eval
high Tool "ssh_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec
high Tool "ssh_shell_session" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_shell_session" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_shell_session
high Tool "ssh_start_stream" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_start_stream" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_start_stream
high Tool "ssh_stop_stream" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_stop_stream" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_stop_stream
high Dynamic code execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py:91`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(compile(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/python_shell/driver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/python_shell/driver.py:127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/python_shell/driver.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lablink/interfaces/visa/driver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lablink/interfaces/visa/driver.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lablink/interfaces/visa/driver.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/interfaces/test_python_shell.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/interfaces/test_python_shell.py:728`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/interfaces/test_python_shell.py
low Mutating tool "python_shell_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "python_shell_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool python_shell_exec
low Mutating tool "python_shell_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "python_shell_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool python_shell_eval
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec
low Mutating tool "ssh_shell_session" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_shell_session" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_shell_session
low Mutating tool "ssh_start_stream" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_start_stream" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_start_stream
low Mutating tool "ssh_stop_stream" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_stop_stream" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_stop_stream
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"lablink-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package lablink-mcp
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
C 72/100 | 20 | 1.7.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan lablink-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Learning & Documentation
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