L402 Kit (ShinyDapps) MCP Server
l402-kit
npm
v1.10.1
Published by shinydapps — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Add Bitcoin Lightning pay-per-call to any API in 3 lines. L402 protocol, zero config, 0.3% fee. npm install l402-kit
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/agent/wallets/BlinkWallet.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/wallets/BlinkWallet.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.blink.sv/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/wallets/BlinkWallet.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mcp/src/agent/wallets/BlinkWallet.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/src/agent/wallets/BlinkWallet.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.blink.sv/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/src/agent/wallets/BlinkWallet.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mcp/src/providers/blink.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/src/providers/blink.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.blink.sv/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/src/providers/blink.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mcp/src/split.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/src/split.js:53`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://api.blink.sv/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/src/split.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/providers/blink.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/blink.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.blink.sv/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/providers/blink.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/split.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/split.js:53`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://api.blink.sv/graphql", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/split.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "l402_fetch"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "l402_fetch" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool l402_fetch · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "verity_scrape"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "verity_scrape" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool verity_scrape · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/agent/wallets/NWCWallet.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/wallets/NWCWallet.js:70`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .then(s => __importStar(require(s)))); } catch { throw new Error('NWCWallet requires the opt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/wallets/NWCWallet.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/mcp/src/agent/wallets/NWCWallet.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/src/agent/wallets/NWCWallet.js:70`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .then(s => __importStar(require(s)))); } catch { throw new Error('NWCWallet requires the opt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/src/agent/wallets/NWCWallet.js
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
l402_fetchingests untrusted inputverity_researchingests untrusted inputverity_scrapeingests untrusted inputl402_balanceno sensitive capabilityl402_set_budgetno sensitive capabilityl402_spending_reportno sensitive capabilityverity_alphano sensitive capabilityverity_btc_priceno sensitive capabilityverity_domain_intelno sensitive capabilityverity_integrationno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
verity_pricingno sensitive capabilityverity_searchno sensitive capabilityverity_sentimentno sensitive capabilityverity_summarizeno sensitive capabilityverity_translateno sensitive capabilityverity_worldstateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.10.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan l402-kit --onlineOther implementations of L402 Kit 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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