Orchard MCP Server
@l22-io/orchard-mcp
npm
v0.6.4
Published by @l22-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for local macOS apps and files using native frameworks
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { resolve, dirname } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/bridge.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ile, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { resolve, dirname } from "node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@l22-io/orchard-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: bash scripts/postinstall.sh
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @l22-io/orchard-mcp
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mail.read_messageingests untrusted inputmail.save_attachmentingests untrusted inputmail.unread_summaryingests untrusted inputcalendar.list_calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar.list_eventsno sensitive capabilitycalendar.searchno sensitive capabilitycalendar.todayno sensitive capabilitycontacts.list_groupsno sensitive capabilitycontacts.read_contactno sensitive capabilitycontacts.searchno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
files.copyno sensitive capabilityfiles.create_folderno sensitive capabilityfiles.infono sensitive capabilityfiles.listno sensitive capabilityfiles.moveno sensitive capabilityfiles.readno sensitive capabilityfiles.searchno sensitive capabilityfiles.trashno sensitive capabilitykeynote.add_slideno sensitive capabilitykeynote.createno sensitive capabilitykeynote.edit_slideno sensitive capabilitykeynote.exportno sensitive capabilitykeynote.infono sensitive capabilitykeynote.list_slidesno sensitive capabilitykeynote.list_themesno sensitive capabilitykeynote.readno sensitive capabilitykeynote.remove_slideno sensitive capabilitykeynote.reorder_slidesno sensitive capabilitykeynote.searchno sensitive capabilitymail.create_draftno sensitive capabilitymail.flaggedno sensitive capabilitymail.list_accountsno sensitive capabilitymail.searchno sensitive capabilitynotes.list_foldersno sensitive capabilitynotes.list_notesno sensitive capabilitynotes.read_noteno sensitive capabilitynotes.searchno sensitive capabilitynumbers.add_sheetno sensitive capabilitynumbers.createno sensitive capabilitynumbers.exportno sensitive capabilitynumbers.get_formulasno sensitive capabilitynumbers.infono sensitive capabilitynumbers.list_sheetsno sensitive capabilitynumbers.readno sensitive capabilitynumbers.remove_sheetno sensitive capabilitynumbers.searchno sensitive capabilitynumbers.writeno sensitive capabilitypages.createno sensitive capabilitypages.exportno sensitive capabilitypages.find_replaceno sensitive capabilitypages.infono sensitive capabilitypages.insert_tableno sensitive capabilitypages.list_sectionsno sensitive capabilitypages.readno sensitive capabilitypages.searchno sensitive capabilitypages.writeno sensitive capabilityreminders.complete_reminderno sensitive capabilityreminders.create_listno sensitive capabilityreminders.create_reminderno sensitive capabilityreminders.delete_listno sensitive capabilityreminders.delete_reminderno sensitive capabilityreminders.list_listsno sensitive capabilityreminders.list_remindersno sensitive capabilityreminders.todayno sensitive capabilitysystem.doctorno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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