Kula Ai MCP Server

@kula-ai/mcp-server npm v0.1.8 Source verified

Published by kula-ai — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MCP server for the Kula recruiting API

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "create_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow create_webhook

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([create_webhook]) and tools that can send data out ([create_interview, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, enable_webhook, disable_webhook, rotate_webhook_secret, test_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [create_webhook] → sinks [create_interview, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, enable_webhook, disable_webhook, rotate_webhook_secret, test

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow create_webhook → create_interview

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url

Tools 84

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive data
  • create_interviewnetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • disable_webhooknetwork egress
  • enable_webhooknetwork egress
  • rotate_webhook_secretnetwork egress
  • test_webhooknetwork egress
  • update_webhooknetwork egress
  • cancel_interviewno sensitive capability
  • check_interviewers_availabilityno sensitive capability
Show 74 more tools ↓
  • close_requisitionno sensitive capability
  • create_application_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_candidateno sensitive capability
  • create_job_stageno sensitive capability
  • create_requisitionno sensitive capability
  • create_userno sensitive capability
  • deactivate_userno sensitive capability
  • find_companiesno sensitive capability
  • find_currenciesno sensitive capability
  • find_degreesno sensitive capability
  • find_disciplinesno sensitive capability
  • find_industriesno sensitive capability
  • find_institutionsno sensitive capability
  • find_locationsno sensitive capability
  • find_skillsno sensitive capability
  • find_tagsno sensitive capability
  • get_applicationno sensitive capability
  • get_candidateno sensitive capability
  • get_email_templateno sensitive capability
  • get_interviewno sensitive capability
  • get_interview_planno sensitive capability
  • get_interviewers_availability_resultno sensitive capability
  • get_jobno sensitive capability
  • get_job_postno sensitive capability
  • get_requisitionno sensitive capability
  • get_roleno sensitive capability
  • get_scorecard_templateno sensitive capability
  • get_userno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • get_webhook_sample_payloadno sensitive capability
  • list_application_interviewsno sensitive capability
  • list_application_notesno sensitive capability
  • list_applicationsno sensitive capability
  • list_candidatesno sensitive capability
  • list_conference_hostsno sensitive capability
  • list_custom_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_degreesno sensitive capability
  • list_departmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_email_templatesno sensitive capability
  • list_industriesno sensitive capability
  • list_interviewsno sensitive capability
  • list_job_postsno sensitive capability
  • list_job_stagesno sensitive capability
  • list_jobsno sensitive capability
  • list_milestonesno sensitive capability
  • list_officesno sensitive capability
  • list_rejection_reasonsno sensitive capability
  • list_requisition_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_requisitionsno sensitive capability
  • list_rolesno sensitive capability
  • list_scorecard_submissionsno sensitive capability
  • list_scorecard_templatesno sensitive capability
  • list_sourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_stage_activitiesno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • list_valid_organizersno sensitive capability
  • list_webhook_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhook_logsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • mark_candidate_no_showno sensitive capability
  • reactivate_userno sensitive capability
  • search_candidatesno sensitive capability
  • search_companiesno sensitive capability
  • search_disciplinesno sensitive capability
  • search_institutionsno sensitive capability
  • search_jobsno sensitive capability
  • search_locationsno sensitive capability
  • undo_candidate_no_showno sensitive capability
  • update_application_noteno sensitive capability
  • update_application_stageno sensitive capability
  • update_candidateno sensitive capability
  • update_interviewno sensitive capability
  • update_requisitionno sensitive capability
  • update_userno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 2

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.8 latest A 94/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @kula-ai/mcp-server --online

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