YouTube (kud) MCP Server
@kud/mcp-youtube
npm
v0.2.0
Source verified
Published by kud — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Covers the full YouTube Data API v3: playlists, videos, channels, community posts, captions, and media.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = await import("child_process"); const { dirname, join: pathJoin } = await import("path"); const { fileU
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list-videos, download-caption]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create-comment-thread]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list-videos, download-caption] → sinks [create-comment-thread]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list-videos → create-comment-thread
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`setup.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process" import { google } from "googleapis" const REDIRECT_PORT = 8391 const REDIRECT_UR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.js
Tools 52
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create-comment-threadnetwork egressdownload-captioningests untrusted inputlist-videosingests untrusted inputadd-to-playlistno sensitive capabilityclean-playlistno sensitive capabilitycreate-channel-sectionno sensitive capabilitycreate-playlistno sensitive capabilitydelete-captionno sensitive capabilitydelete-channel-sectionno sensitive capabilitydelete-commentno sensitive capability
Show 42 more tools ↓
delete-playlistno sensitive capabilitydelete-playlist-imageno sensitive capabilitydelete-videono sensitive capabilityget-playlistno sensitive capabilityget-video-ratingno sensitive capabilitylist-activitiesno sensitive capabilitylist-captionsno sensitive capabilitylist-channel-sectionsno sensitive capabilitylist-channelsno sensitive capabilitylist-comment-threadsno sensitive capabilitylist-commentsno sensitive capabilitylist-i18n-languagesno sensitive capabilitylist-i18n-regionsno sensitive capabilitylist-membersno sensitive capabilitylist-membership-levelsno sensitive capabilitylist-playlist-imagesno sensitive capabilitylist-playlistsno sensitive capabilitylist-subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist-video-abuse-report-reasonsno sensitive capabilitylist-video-categoriesno sensitive capabilityrate-videono sensitive capabilityremove-from-playlistno sensitive capabilityreply-to-commentno sensitive capabilityreport-video-abuseno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityset-comment-moderation-statusno sensitive capabilityset-thumbnailno sensitive capabilityset-watermarkno sensitive capabilitysubscribeno sensitive capabilityunset-watermarkno sensitive capabilityunsubscribeno sensitive capabilityupdate-captionno sensitive capabilityupdate-channelno sensitive capabilityupdate-channel-sectionno sensitive capabilityupdate-commentno sensitive capabilityupdate-playlistno sensitive capabilityupdate-playlist-imageno sensitive capabilityupdate-playlist-itemno sensitive capabilityupdate-videono sensitive capabilityupload-captionno sensitive capabilityupload-playlist-imageno sensitive capabilityupload-videono sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @kud/mcp-youtube --onlineOther implementations of YouTube 20
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 21 side by side →
Returns token-optimized, structured YouTube data using the YouTube Data API v3.
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MCPサーバーとして、YouTube動画の字幕を取得できるツールです。
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