Ksp MCP Server
ksp-mcp
npm
v0.2.2
Published by caseys — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for KSP automation via kOS and MechJeb
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon/daemon-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon/daemon-client.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import * as path from 'node:path'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon/daemon-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/tmux-transport.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/tmux-transport.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { BaseTransport } from './transport.js'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/tmux-transport.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/bring-to-foreground.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/bring-to-foreground.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/bring-to-foreground.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/daemon/daemon-client.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/daemon/daemon-client.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import * as path from 'node:path'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/daemon/daemon-client.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/transport/tmux-transport.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/transport/tmux-transport.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { BaseTransport } from './transport.js'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/transport/tmux-transport.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/bring-to-foreground.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/bring-to-foreground.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/bring-to-foreground.ts
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool command
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
commandruns code / shelladjust_apoapsisno sensitive capabilityadjust_periapsisno sensitive capabilitychange_ascending_nodeno sensitive capabilitychange_eccentricityno sensitive capabilitychange_inclinationno sensitive capabilitychange_periapsis_longitudeno sensitive capabilitychange_semi_major_axisno sensitive capabilitycircularizeno sensitive capabilityclear_nodesno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
clear_targetno sensitive capabilitycourse_correctno sensitive capabilitydisconnectno sensitive capabilityellipticizeno sensitive capabilityexecute_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_targetno sensitive capabilityhohmann_transferno sensitive capabilityinterplanetary_transferno sensitive capabilitylaunch_ascentno sensitive capabilitylaunch_ascent_abortno sensitive capabilitylaunch_ascent_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_cpusno sensitive capabilitylist_savesno sensitive capabilityload_saveno sensitive capabilitymatch_planesno sensitive capabilitymatch_velocitiesno sensitive capabilityquicksaveno sensitive capabilityresonant_orbitno sensitive capabilityreturn_from_moonno sensitive capabilityset_targetno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilityswitch_cpuno sensitive capabilitytelemetryno sensitive capabilitywarpno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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