Kratos (PyPI) MCP Server
kratos-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kratos_mcp/bridge.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/kratos_mcp/bridge.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [env.python, "-m", "kratos_mcp.worker", "--request-file
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/kratos_mcp/bridge.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kratos_mcp/jobs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/kratos_mcp/jobs.py:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .log", "wb") proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, env=run_env, stdout=log, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, stdin=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/kratos_mcp/jobs.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kratos_mcp/kratos_env.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/kratos_mcp/kratos_env.py:129`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: our stdout. probe = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", "import KratosMultiphysics"], capture_out
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/kratos_mcp/kratos_env.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kratos_mcp/render_worker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/kratos_mcp/render_worker.py:180`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = os.pipe() proc = subprocess.Popen( ["Xvfb", "-displayfd", str(write_fd), "-screen", "0", "1280x1024x24"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/kratos_mcp/render_worker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kratos_mcp/tools/visualize.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/kratos_mcp/tools/visualize.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "kratos_mcp.render_worker", "--r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/kratos_mcp/tools/visualize.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_visualize.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_visualize.py:115`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: gs": args})) proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "kratos_mcp.render_worker", "--request-f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_visualize.py
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_boundary_conditionno sensitive capabilityadd_output_processno sensitive capabilitycreate_materialsno sensitive capabilitycreate_multistage_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_parametersno sensitive capabilityexplain_project_parametersno sensitive capabilityexport_case_to_flowgraphno sensitive capabilityimport_flowgraph_to_caseno sensitive capabilityjob_cancelno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
job_listno sensitive capabilityjob_logsno sensitive capabilityjob_statusno sensitive capabilitykratos_check_installationno sensitive capabilitykratos_get_process_defaultsno sensitive capabilitykratos_get_solver_defaultsno sensitive capabilitykratos_installno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_applicationsno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_conditionsno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_constitutive_lawsno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_elementsno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_processesno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_solversno sensitive capabilitykratos_list_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_linear_solver_presetsno sensitive capabilitylist_material_presetsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitymdpa_create_structured_meshno sensitive capabilitymdpa_get_nodesno sensitive capabilitymdpa_inspectno sensitive capabilitymdpa_validateno sensitive capabilityresults_animateno sensitive capabilityresults_convergenceno sensitive capabilityresults_listno sensitive capabilityresults_probeno sensitive capabilityresults_renderno sensitive capabilityresults_summaryno sensitive capabilityrun_simulationno sensitive capabilityvalidate_caseno sensitive capabilityvalidate_project_parametersno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan kratos-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Kratos 1
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