Koreanpulse MCP Server

koreanpulse PyPI v0.1.13

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
C
75/100
Last scanned
Trust
C · 75/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
C Why this grade 100 − 25.2 = 75/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−23.1 Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-004 injection
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (tests/test_corp_code.py)MTC-SRC-004

In the server's implementation (`tests/test_corp_code.py:212`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: \xec\x82\xbc\xec\x84\xb1\xec\xa0\x84\xec\x9e\x90

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/test_corp_code.py

high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (tests/test_news.py)MTC-SRC-004

In the server's implementation (`tests/test_news.py:206`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: \xec\x82\xbc\xec\x84\xb1\xec\xa0\x84\xec\x9e\x90

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/test_news.py

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (cache-worker/src/translate.ts)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`cache-worker/src/translate.ts:98`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch( "https://gateway.ai.cloudflare.com/v1/520ed8d88fdd95e30af7d0a0e81c1706/koreanpulse/openai/chat/completions"

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server cache-worker/src/translate.ts

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (daily-worker/src/translate.ts)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`daily-worker/src/translate.ts:68`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch( "https://gateway.ai.cloudflare.com/v1/520ed8d88fdd95e30af7d0a0e81c1706/koreanpulse/openai/chat/completions"

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server daily-worker/src/translate.ts

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (webhook-worker/src/email.ts)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`webhook-worker/src/email.ts:162`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch("https://api.resend.com/emails"

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server webhook-worker/src/email.ts

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"koreanpulse" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package koreanpulse

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.13 latest C 75/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: C · 75/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan koreanpulse --online --registry pypi

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