Koreanpulse MCP Server
koreanpulse
PyPI
v0.1.13
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Korean stock market intelligence for AI assistants — track DART filings, foreign & activist investor activity, and classified Korean industry news, in English. MCP server for ChatGPT / Claude / Cursor / FastMCP agents. Free public daily web snapshot + paid Cloud.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (cache-worker/src/translate.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`cache-worker/src/translate.ts:98`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s. const resp = await fetch( "https://gateway.ai.cloudflare.com/v1/520ed8d88fdd95e30af7d0a0e81c1706/koreanpulse/op
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cache-worker/src/translate.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (daily-worker/src/translate.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`daily-worker/src/translate.ts:68`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: a. const resp = await fetch( "https://gateway.ai.cloudflare.com/v1/520ed8d88fdd95e30af7d0a0e81c1706/koreanpulse/op
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server daily-worker/src/translate.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (webhook-worker/src/email.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`webhook-worker/src/email.ts:162`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://api.resend.com/emails", { method: "POST", headers: { Authoriz
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server webhook-worker/src/email.ts
Tools 6
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
koreanpulse_aboutno sensitive capabilitylookup_corp_codeno sensitive capabilitymonitor_activist_investorsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_foreign_holdersno sensitive capabilityresolve_stock_codeno sensitive capabilitytrack_korean_filingsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.13 latest |
A 95/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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