Korean Law Alio MCP Server
korean-law-alio-mcp
npm
v1.0.8
Published by scvcoder — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
국가법령정보센터(법제처) + ALIO 공공기관 규정 통합 MCP 서버 — 35,000건 이상의 법령·공공기관 내부규정을 자연어로 조회·비교·분석
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/lib/alio/docling-fallback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/lib/alio/docling-fallback.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; import os from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/lib/alio/docling-fallback.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/lib/alio/hwp3-fallback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/lib/alio/hwp3-fallback.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; import os from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/lib/alio/hwp3-fallback.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/lib/alio/xls-fallback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/lib/alio/xls-fallback.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; import os from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/lib/alio/xls-fallback.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/scripts/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/scripts/setup.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { Readable } from "node:stream"; import { pipeline } from "node:stream/pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/scripts/setup.js
Tools 110
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
advanced_alio_searchno sensitive capabilityadvanced_searchno sensitive capabilityanalyze_alio_regulationno sensitive capabilityanalyze_documentno sensitive capabilityanalyze_regulation_delegationno sensitive capabilitychain_action_basisno sensitive capabilitychain_alio_benchmarkno sensitive capabilitychain_amendment_trackno sensitive capabilitychain_dispute_prepno sensitive capabilitychain_document_reviewno sensitive capability
Show 100 more tools ↓
chain_full_researchno sensitive capabilitychain_law_systemno sensitive capabilitychain_ordinance_compareno sensitive capabilitychain_procedure_detailno sensitive capabilitycompare_admin_rule_old_newno sensitive capabilitycompare_alio_articlesno sensitive capabilitycompare_alio_regulationsno sensitive capabilitycompare_articlesno sensitive capabilitycompare_old_newno sensitive capabilitycompare_regulation_timelineno sensitive capabilityextract_precedent_keywordsno sensitive capabilityfind_regulations_by_upper_lawno sensitive capabilityfind_similar_precedentsno sensitive capabilityfind_similar_regulationsno sensitive capabilityget_acr_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_acr_special_appeal_textno sensitive capabilityget_admin_appeal_textno sensitive capabilityget_admin_ruleno sensitive capabilityget_alio_annexesno sensitive capabilityget_alio_external_linksno sensitive capabilityget_alio_institution_profileno sensitive capabilityget_alio_regulationno sensitive capabilityget_alio_regulation_historyno sensitive capabilityget_alio_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_annexesno sensitive capabilityget_appeal_review_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_article_detailno sensitive capabilityget_article_historyno sensitive capabilityget_article_with_precedentsno sensitive capabilityget_batch_alio_regulationsno sensitive capabilityget_batch_articlesno sensitive capabilityget_constitutional_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_customs_interpretation_textno sensitive capabilityget_daily_termno sensitive capabilityget_daily_to_legalno sensitive capabilityget_delegated_lawsno sensitive capabilityget_english_law_textno sensitive capabilityget_external_linksno sensitive capabilityget_ftc_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_historical_lawno sensitive capabilityget_interpretation_textno sensitive capabilityget_law_abbreviationsno sensitive capabilityget_law_historyno sensitive capabilityget_law_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_law_system_treeno sensitive capabilityget_law_textno sensitive capabilityget_law_treeno sensitive capabilityget_legal_term_detailno sensitive capabilityget_legal_term_kbno sensitive capabilityget_legal_to_dailyno sensitive capabilityget_linked_laws_from_ordinanceno sensitive capabilityget_linked_ordinance_articlesno sensitive capabilityget_linked_ordinancesno sensitive capabilityget_nlrc_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_ordinanceno sensitive capabilityget_pipc_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_precedent_textno sensitive capabilityget_public_corp_rule_textno sensitive capabilityget_public_institution_rule_textno sensitive capabilityget_recent_alio_revisionsno sensitive capabilityget_related_lawsno sensitive capabilityget_school_rule_textno sensitive capabilityget_tax_tribunal_decision_textno sensitive capabilityget_term_articlesno sensitive capabilityget_three_tierno sensitive capabilityget_treaty_textno sensitive capabilitylist_alio_regulationsno sensitive capabilityparse_alio_article_linksno sensitive capabilityparse_article_linksno sensitive capabilityparse_jo_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_acr_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_acr_special_appealsno sensitive capabilitysearch_admin_appealsno sensitive capabilitysearch_admin_ruleno sensitive capabilitysearch_ai_lawno sensitive capabilitysearch_alio_regulation_textno sensitive capabilitysearch_allno sensitive capabilitysearch_appeal_review_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_constitutional_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_customs_interpretationsno sensitive capabilitysearch_english_lawno sensitive capabilitysearch_ftc_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_historical_lawno sensitive capabilitysearch_institutionno sensitive capabilitysearch_interpretationsno sensitive capabilitysearch_lawno sensitive capabilitysearch_legal_termsno sensitive capabilitysearch_nlrc_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_ordinanceno sensitive capabilitysearch_pipc_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_precedentsno sensitive capabilitysearch_public_corp_rulesno sensitive capabilitysearch_public_institution_rulesno sensitive capabilitysearch_school_rulesno sensitive capabilitysearch_tax_tribunal_decisionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_treatiesno sensitive capabilitysuggest_alio_benchmarkno sensitive capabilitysuggest_alio_regulation_namesno sensitive capabilitysuggest_law_namesno sensitive capabilitysummarize_precedentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (110 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.8 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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