Shopify (kockatoos) MCP Server

@kockatoos/shopify-mcp npm v1.0.9

Published by @kockatoos — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Shopify Admin API — lets AI agents manage a Shopify store

Trust grade
B
89/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 89/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
Share this Trust Score
𝕏 Share LinkedIn Reddit
B Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 89/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 7

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_bundle → list_files → create_webhook. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow get_bundle → list_files → create_webhook

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/get-token.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/get-token.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: require("http")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); // Load .env from CWD first, then package dir fallba

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/get-token.js

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/get-token.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/get-token.js:82`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://${shop}/admin/oauth/access_token`, { method: "POST", headers: {

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/get-token.js

medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool create_file

medium Tool "delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool delete_files

low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool create_file

low Mutating tool "delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool delete_files

Tools 136

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_filewrites files
  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_fileswrites files
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • get_bundleingests untrusted input
  • get_bundle_operationingests untrusted input
  • get_pageingests untrusted input
  • list_filesreads sensitive data
  • update_webhooknetwork egress
  • activate_automatic_discountno sensitive capability
Show 126 more tools ↓
  • activate_code_discountno sensitive capability
  • add_product_to_collectionno sensitive capability
  • adjust_inventoryno sensitive capability
  • cancel_fulfillmentno sensitive capability
  • cancel_orderno sensitive capability
  • close_orderno sensitive capability
  • complete_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • create_automatic_discount_basicno sensitive capability
  • create_automatic_discount_bxgyno sensitive capability
  • create_automatic_discount_free_shippingno sensitive capability
  • create_bundleno sensitive capability
  • create_code_discount_basicno sensitive capability
  • create_code_discount_bxgyno sensitive capability
  • create_code_discount_free_shippingno sensitive capability
  • create_custom_collectionno sensitive capability
  • create_customerno sensitive capability
  • create_discount_codeno sensitive capability
  • create_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • create_fulfillmentno sensitive capability
  • create_menuno sensitive capability
  • create_metafield_definitionno sensitive capability
  • create_pageno sensitive capability
  • create_price_ruleno sensitive capability
  • create_productno sensitive capability
  • create_product_imageno sensitive capability
  • create_smart_collectionno sensitive capability
  • create_themeno sensitive capability
  • create_variantno sensitive capability
  • deactivate_automatic_discountno sensitive capability
  • deactivate_code_discountno sensitive capability
  • delete_automatic_discountno sensitive capability
  • delete_code_discountno sensitive capability
  • delete_custom_collectionno sensitive capability
  • delete_customer_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • delete_discount_codeno sensitive capability
  • delete_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • delete_menuno sensitive capability
  • delete_order_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • delete_pageno sensitive capability
  • delete_price_ruleno sensitive capability
  • delete_productno sensitive capability
  • delete_product_imageno sensitive capability
  • delete_product_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • delete_themeno sensitive capability
  • delete_theme_filesno sensitive capability
  • delete_variantno sensitive capability
  • get_app_installationno sensitive capability
  • get_automatic_discountno sensitive capability
  • get_code_discountno sensitive capability
  • get_custom_collectionno sensitive capability
  • get_customerno sensitive capability
  • get_customer_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • get_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • get_locationno sensitive capability
  • get_menuno sensitive capability
  • get_orderno sensitive capability
  • get_order_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • get_price_ruleno sensitive capability
  • get_productno sensitive capability
  • get_product_imageno sensitive capability
  • get_product_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • get_shop_infono sensitive capability
  • get_smart_collectionno sensitive capability
  • get_themeno sensitive capability
  • get_theme_filesno sensitive capability
  • get_variantno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • list_app_installationsno sensitive capability
  • list_automatic_discountsno sensitive capability
  • list_code_discountsno sensitive capability
  • list_collection_productsno sensitive capability
  • list_custom_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_customer_metafieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_customersno sensitive capability
  • list_discount_codesno sensitive capability
  • list_draft_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_fulfillment_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_fulfillmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_inventory_levelsno sensitive capability
  • list_locationsno sensitive capability
  • list_menusno sensitive capability
  • list_metafield_definitionsno sensitive capability
  • list_order_metafieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_pagesno sensitive capability
  • list_price_rulesno sensitive capability
  • list_product_imagesno sensitive capability
  • list_product_metafieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_productsno sensitive capability
  • list_smart_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_theme_filesno sensitive capability
  • list_themesno sensitive capability
  • list_variantsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • publish_themeno sensitive capability
  • remove_product_from_collectionno sensitive capability
  • reorder_collection_productsno sensitive capability
  • search_customersno sensitive capability
  • send_draft_order_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • set_customer_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • set_inventoryno sensitive capability
  • set_order_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • set_product_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • stage_uploadno sensitive capability
  • update_automatic_discount_basicno sensitive capability
  • update_automatic_discount_bxgyno sensitive capability
  • update_automatic_discount_free_shippingno sensitive capability
  • update_bundleno sensitive capability
  • update_code_discount_basicno sensitive capability
  • update_code_discount_bxgyno sensitive capability
  • update_code_discount_free_shippingno sensitive capability
  • update_custom_collectionno sensitive capability
  • update_customerno sensitive capability
  • update_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • update_fileno sensitive capability
  • update_fulfillment_trackingno sensitive capability
  • update_menuno sensitive capability
  • update_orderno sensitive capability
  • update_pageno sensitive capability
  • update_price_ruleno sensitive capability
  • update_productno sensitive capability
  • update_product_imageno sensitive capability
  • update_smart_collectionno sensitive capability
  • update_themeno sensitive capability
  • update_variantno sensitive capability
  • upsert_theme_filesno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.9 latest B 89/100 7 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: B · 89/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/kockatoos-shopify-mcp/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/kockatoos-shopify-mcp)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/kockatoos-shopify-mcp"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/kockatoos-shopify-mcp/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/kockatoos-shopify-mcp/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @kockatoos/shopify-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Shopify 14

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 15 side by side →

More in Business & CRM