Kitty Hive — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "kitty-hive",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "kitty-hive"
},
"server": {
"name": "kitty-hive"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 79,
"threatScore": 89,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.03,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (codex-channel.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`codex-channel.ts:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "codex-channel.ts"
},
"evidence": "ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createServer } from 'nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "codex-channel.ts",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/codex-supervisor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/codex-supervisor.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/codex-supervisor.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'no",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/codex-supervisor.js",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { buildPushMessage } from './preview.js'; import { AGENT_EVENT_MODES } fr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/opencode-supervisor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/opencode-supervisor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/opencode-supervisor.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/opencode-supervisor.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tunnel.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tunnel.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tunnel.js"
},
"evidence": ", execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; const URL_REGEX = /https:\\/\\/[a-z0-9-]+\\.t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tunnel.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (opencode-channel.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`opencode-channel.ts:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "opencode-channel.ts"
},
"evidence": "ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import { createServer, type Server as HttpServer } from 'node:http'; import { cr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "opencode-channel.ts",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (codex-channel.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`codex-channel.ts:100`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "codex-channel.ts"
},
"evidence": "EX_CMD set) try { execSync(`${CODEX_CMD} --version`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); } catch { console.error(`[codex-cha",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "codex-channel.ts",
"line": 100,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:378`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`${codex} mcp add hive --url ${url}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); return { ok: true",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 378,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tunnel.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tunnel.js:16`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tunnel.js"
},
"evidence": "const out = execSync(`where ${name}`, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim().split(/\\r?\\n/)[0]; if (ou",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tunnel.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "hive-whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_update_role",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_codex_pane_ws",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_opencode_pane_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_dm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_dm_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_file_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "hive_inbox",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_dm\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "hive_peers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_remote_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_task_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_task_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_task_complete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_workflow_propose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_workflow_approve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_workflow_step_complete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_workflow_step_approve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_workflow_reject",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_join",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_set_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_teams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_rename_nickname",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hive_team_leave",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "aef14b7656d7fbaf4f010b7fc94e9901280062404a9a0a81aebdc98eb17ead9a",
"stats": {
"tools": 35,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}