Kitsune — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "kitsune-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "kitsune-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "kitsune-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/kitsune-mcp.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/kitsune-mcp.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/kitsune-mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const args = process.argv.slice(2); function run(cmd, cmdArgs) { const proc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/kitsune-mcp.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evals/tasks/codegen/002-cli-arg-parser/grader.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evals/tasks/codegen/002-cli-arg-parser/grader.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evals/tasks/codegen/002-cli-arg-parser/grader.py"
},
"evidence": "str, str]: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(script)] + args, capture_output=True, text=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evals/tasks/codegen/002-cli-arg-parser/grader.py",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evals/tasks/multi_step/001-cross-file-rename/grader.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evals/tasks/multi_step/001-cross-file-rename/grader.py:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evals/tasks/multi_step/001-cross-file-rename/grader.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(sealed)], cwd=workdir, capture_outp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evals/tasks/multi_step/001-cross-file-rename/grader.py",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evals/tasks/refactor/001-pure-impure-split/grader.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evals/tasks/refactor/001-pure-impure-split/grader.py:122`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evals/tasks/refactor/001-pure-impure-split/grader.py"
},
"evidence": "xists(): proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(test_file)], cwd=workdir, capture_o",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evals/tasks/refactor/001-pure-impure-split/grader.py",
"line": 122,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (kitsune_mcp/utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`kitsune_mcp/utils.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "kitsune_mcp/utils.py"
},
"evidence": "as argv) out = subprocess.run( [\"ps\", \"-o\", \"rss=\", \"-p\", str(pid)], capture_output=Tru",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "kitsune_mcp/utils.py",
"line": 157,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_audit_fixes.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_audit_fixes.py:72`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_audit_fixes.py"
},
"evidence": "result = await fetch(\"https://example.com/\") assert \"Blocked\" in result or \"Failed\" in result @pyt",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_audit_fixes.py",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ssrf.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ssrf.py:56`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_ssrf.py"
},
"evidence": "etch result = await fetch(\"https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\") assert \"Blocked\" in result @pytest.mark",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_ssrf.py",
"line": 56,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_kitsune_home.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_kitsune_home.py:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_kitsune_home.py"
},
"evidence": "str(iso)} out = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", code], capture_output=True, text=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_kitsune_home.py",
"line": 53,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bench",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auto",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "onboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "shapeshift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "shiftback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "craft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prewarm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b9718a78ab4f94e2365046a0bc873d358a823994a4a3ced3b0fe79c2ea34b0a0",
"stats": {
"tools": 22,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}