Kite (dev-hitesh-gupta) MCP Server
kite-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by dev-hitesh-gupta — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Zerodha Kite MCP Server — real-time Indian stock market analysis through Claude. 27 tools for market data, technical analysis, fundamental analysis, portfolio tracking, and stock screening via Zerodha Kite Connect API.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/trader/llm-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/trader/llm-analyzer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, mkdtempSync, rmdirSync } from 'f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/trader/llm-analyzer.js
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
advisor_analyze_deepno sensitive capabilityadvisor_get_briefingno sensitive capabilityadvisor_get_earnings_calendarno sensitive capabilityadvisor_get_market_newsno sensitive capabilityadvisor_get_newsno sensitive capabilityadvisor_get_portfolio_riskno sensitive capabilityadvisor_scan_opportunitiesno sensitive capabilitykite_analyze_stockno sensitive capabilitykite_calculate_bollingerno sensitive capabilitykite_calculate_emano sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
kite_calculate_macdno sensitive capabilitykite_calculate_rsino sensitive capabilitykite_calculate_smano sensitive capabilitykite_compare_fundamentalsno sensitive capabilitykite_detect_patternsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_company_profileno sensitive capabilitykite_get_dividendsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_financialsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_fundamentalsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_historicalno sensitive capabilitykite_get_holdingsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_index_constituentsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_ltpno sensitive capabilitykite_get_marginsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_ohlcno sensitive capabilitykite_get_positionsno sensitive capabilitykite_get_profileno sensitive capabilitykite_get_quoteno sensitive capabilitykite_get_technical_summaryno sensitive capabilitykite_search_instrumentsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan kite-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Kite 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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