Kiln3d MCP Server

kiln3d PyPI v1.2.0

Published by codeofaxel — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Trust grade
B
89/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 89/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 89/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable
inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 12

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/kiln/plugins/marketplace_tools.py)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/plugins/marketplace_tools.py:324`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ~/.ssh

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/plugins/marketplace_tools.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/cli/bridge_commands.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/cli/bridge_commands.py:254`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.Popen(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/cli/bridge_commands.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/cli/install_openscad.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/cli/install_openscad.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/cli/install_openscad.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/cli/main.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/cli/main.py:336`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/cli/main.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/credential_store.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/credential_store.py:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.check_output(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/credential_store.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/decoration_helpers.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/decoration_helpers.py:169`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/decoration_helpers.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/design_reasoning.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/design_reasoning.py:1909`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/design_reasoning.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/device.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/device.py:94`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/device.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/emboss_generator.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/emboss_generator.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/emboss_generator.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/generation/gemini.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/generation/gemini.py:1078`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/generation/gemini.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/kiln/generation/openscad.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/kiln/generation/openscad.py:137`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/kiln/generation/openscad.py

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([tax_jurisdiction_lookup, download_generated_model, model_files, download_model, browse_models, list_model_categories, marketplace_diagnostics]) co-exist with external-action tools ([analyze_warping_risk]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [tax_jurisdiction_lookup, download_generated_model, model_files, download_model, browse_models, list_model_categories, marketplace_diagnostics] → sink

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow tax_jurisdiction_lookup → analyze_warping_risk

Tools 200

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • analyze_warping_risknetwork egress
  • browse_modelsingests untrusted input
  • download_generated_modelingests untrusted input
  • download_modelingests untrusted input
  • list_model_categoriesingests untrusted input
  • marketplace_diagnosticsingests untrusted input
  • model_filesingests untrusted input
  • tax_jurisdiction_lookupingests untrusted input
  • add_assembly_interfaceno sensitive capability
  • add_assembly_partno sensitive capability
  • add_mesh_chamferno sensitive capability
  • add_mesh_filletno sensitive capability
  • analyze_design_requirementsno sensitive capability
  • analyze_mesh_geometryno sensitive capability
  • analyze_non_manifold_edgesno sensitive capability
  • analyze_scad_codeno sensitive capability
  • analyze_structural_risksno sensitive capability
  • apply_decorationno sensitive capability
  • apply_design_reinforcementsno sensitive capability
  • arrange_parts_on_plateno sensitive capability
  • assess_load_bearingno sensitive capability
  • audit_original_designno sensitive capability
  • auto_arrange_parts_on_plateno sensitive capability
  • auto_color_by_heightno sensitive capability
  • auto_color_by_regionno sensitive capability
  • await_generationno sensitive capability
  • boolean_mesh_opno sensitive capability
  • build_generation_promptno sensitive capability
  • build_parametric_promptno sensitive capability
  • cache_designno sensitive capability
  • cache_design_with_sourceno sensitive capability
  • cache_modelno sensitive capability
  • center_model_on_bedno sensitive capability
  • check_assembly_clearancesno sensitive capability
  • check_firmware_statusno sensitive capability
  • check_material_environmentno sensitive capability
  • check_material_sufficiencyno sensitive capability
  • check_multi_material_pairingno sensitive capability
  • check_print_healthno sensitive capability
  • check_print_readinessno sensitive capability
  • check_printer_material_compatibilityno sensitive capability
  • community_statsno sensitive capability
  • compare_mesh_versionsno sensitive capability
  • compile_scadno sensitive capability
  • compose_assembly_partsno sensitive capability
  • compose_modelsno sensitive capability
  • compose_part_from_primitivesno sensitive capability
  • consumer_onboardingno sensitive capability
  • contribute_community_printno sensitive capability
  • create_assemblyno sensitive capability
  • cross_section_viewno sensitive capability
  • decoration_infono sensitive capability
  • decoration_quota_statusno sensitive capability
  • delete_agent_noteno sensitive capability
  • delete_cached_modelno sensitive capability
  • delete_shipping_profileno sensitive capability
  • design_advisorno sensitive capability
  • design_improvement_planno sensitive capability
  • detect_mesh_pocketsno sensitive capability
  • diagnose_meshno sensitive capability
  • donate_infono sensitive capability
  • estimate_before_designno sensitive capability
  • estimate_costno sensitive capability
  • estimate_material_costno sensitive capability
  • estimate_mesh_print_timeno sensitive capability
  • estimate_mesh_weightno sensitive capability
  • estimate_priceno sensitive capability
  • estimate_print_cost_from_meshno sensitive capability
  • estimate_print_progressno sensitive capability
  • estimate_print_timeno sensitive capability
  • estimate_structural_loadno sensitive capability
  • estimate_support_materialno sensitive capability
  • estimate_timelineno sensitive capability
  • export_model_3mfno sensitive capability
  • extract_model_from_3mfno sensitive capability
  • find_design_templatesno sensitive capability
  • find_material_matchno sensitive capability
  • find_printers_with_materialno sensitive capability
  • find_similar_printsno sensitive capability
  • fingerprint_modelno sensitive capability
  • firmware_statusno sensitive capability
  • forecast_material_consumptionno sensitive capability
  • fulfillment_alertsno sensitive capability
  • fulfillment_cancelno sensitive capability
  • fulfillment_materialsno sensitive capability
  • fulfillment_orderno sensitive capability
  • fulfillment_order_statusno sensitive capability
  • fulfillment_quoteno sensitive capability
  • generate_and_printno sensitive capability
  • generate_modelno sensitive capability
  • generate_model_from_imageno sensitive capability
  • generate_model_with_providerno sensitive capability
  • generate_template_variationsno sensitive capability
  • generate_textureno sensitive capability
  • generation_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_active_materialno sensitive capability
  • get_brand_filament_profileno sensitive capability
  • get_cached_designno sensitive capability
  • get_cached_modelno sensitive capability
  • get_community_insightno sensitive capability
  • get_compatible_materialsno sensitive capability
  • get_design_sourceno sensitive capability
  • get_design_template_infono sensitive capability
  • get_fleet_material_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_joint_recommendationno sensitive capability
  • get_material_consumption_historyno sensitive capability
  • get_material_design_profileno sensitive capability
  • get_material_infono sensitive capability
  • get_material_purchase_urlsno sensitive capability
  • get_model_print_historyno sensitive capability
  • get_post_processing_guideno sensitive capability
  • get_print_diagnosticno sensitive capability
  • get_printer_design_capabilitiesno sensitive capability
  • get_printer_insightsno sensitive capability
  • get_restock_suggestionsno sensitive capability
  • hollow_mesh_modelno sensitive capability
  • infer_print_settingsno sensitive capability
  • insert_into_scadno sensitive capability
  • issue_shipping_confirmation_tokenno sensitive capability
  • iterate_designno sensitive capability
  • kiln_signinno sensitive capability
  • kiln_signin_pollno sensitive capability
  • list_available_materialsno sensitive capability
  • list_brand_filament_profilesno sensitive capability
  • list_cached_designsno sensitive capability
  • list_cached_modelsno sensitive capability
  • list_credentialsno sensitive capability
  • list_decorationsno sensitive capability
  • list_design_componentsno sensitive capability
  • list_design_materialsno sensitive capability
  • list_design_templates_catalogno sensitive capability
  • list_generation_providersno sensitive capability
  • list_material_catalogno sensitive capability
  • list_multi_material_addonsno sensitive capability
  • list_printer_design_profilesno sensitive capability
  • list_shipping_profilesno sensitive capability
  • marketplace_statusno sensitive capability
  • match_design_componentsno sensitive capability
  • match_design_requirementsno sensitive capability
  • merge_mesh_filesno sensitive capability
  • mesh_quality_scorecardno sensitive capability
  • mirror_mesh_modelno sensitive capability
  • model_detailsno sensitive capability
  • modify_scad_moduleno sensitive capability
  • monitor_print_visionno sensitive capability
  • my_toolno sensitive capability
  • optimize_fleet_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • optimize_print_orientationno sensitive capability
  • optimize_template_paramsno sensitive capability
  • parse_scad_parametersno sensitive capability
  • predict_print_settingsno sensitive capability
  • preview_generated_modelno sensitive capability
  • recommend_design_materialno sensitive capability
  • recommend_design_reinforcementsno sensitive capability
  • recommend_materialno sensitive capability
  • record_print_dnano sensitive capability
  • remove_mesh_floating_regionsno sensitive capability
  • repair_meshno sensitive capability
  • repair_mesh_advancedno sensitive capability
  • rescale_modelno sensitive capability
  • resolve_filament_profileno sensitive capability
  • retrieve_credentialno sensitive capability
  • rollback_printer_firmwareno sensitive capability
  • save_decorationno sensitive capability
  • save_shipping_profileno sensitive capability
  • scale_mesh_to_fitno sensitive capability
  • search_all_modelsno sensitive capability
  • search_cached_modelsno sensitive capability
  • search_material_catalogno sensitive capability
  • search_modelsno sensitive capability
  • simplify_mesh_modelno sensitive capability
  • slice_and_estimateno sensitive capability
  • smart_generate_from_templateno sensitive capability
  • solve_template_constraintsno sensitive capability
  • splice_mesh_at_zno sensitive capability
  • split_mesh_by_componentno sensitive capability
  • stop_watch_printno sensitive capability
  • store_credentialno sensitive capability
  • suggest_material_for_orderno sensitive capability
  • suggest_printer_for_jobno sensitive capability
  • suggest_spool_swapsno sensitive capability
  • supported_shipping_countriesno sensitive capability
  • tax_estimateno sensitive capability
  • tax_jurisdictionsno sensitive capability
  • thicken_mesh_wallsno sensitive capability
  • troubleshoot_print_issueno sensitive capability
  • tweak_and_compile_scadno sensitive capability
  • update_printer_firmwareno sensitive capability
  • update_scad_parameterno sensitive capability
  • validate_and_prepare_meshno sensitive capability
  • validate_assemblyno sensitive capability
  • validate_design_for_requirementsno sensitive capability
  • validate_gcodeno sensitive capability
  • validate_gcode_safeno sensitive capability
  • validate_generated_meshno sensitive capability
  • validate_print_qualityno sensitive capability
  • validate_scad_parametersno sensitive capability
  • validate_shipping_addressno sensitive capability
  • watch_printno sensitive capability
  • watch_print_statusno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.2.0 latest B 89/100 12 1.8.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: B · 89/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan kiln3d --online --registry pypi

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