Keyblind MCP Server
keyblind
npm
v0.6.0
Published by aarifmms — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Blind AI to your keys — encrypted secrets vault with MCP for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 12.3 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −12.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×5 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 7 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:os"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { resolveSecret, listSecrets, storeSecret } from "./vault.js"; function h
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from "node:child_process"; import readline from "node:readline"; import { stdin, stdout } from "node:proces
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hook.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/hook.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; const SECRET_PATTERNS =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hook.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/setup-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup-mcp.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; function hasCommand(cmd) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { stdio: "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sso.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sso.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { storeSecret, resolveSecret, deleteSecret } from "./vault.js"; const SSO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sso.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:60`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: re" }); execSync(`sudo -p "${prompt} — authenticate with Touch ID: " echo "keyblind-auth"`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/backends.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends.js:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: md) { try { execSync(`command -v ${cmd}`, { stdio: "ignore", timeout: 2000 }); return true; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:372`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -open"; execSync(`${openCmd} "${url}"`); console.log("Browser opened. Sign in to continu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/setup-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup-mcp.js:4`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: md) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { stdio: "ignore" }); return true; } catch { re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup-mcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/sso.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/sso.js:175`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`${openCmd} "${authUrl.toString()}"`); } catch {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sso.js
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_secretsreads sensitive dataaudit_logno sensitive capabilitycreate_share_linkno sensitive capabilitydeadman_checkinno sensitive capabilitydeadman_statusno sensitive capabilitydelete_secretno sensitive capabilityreceive_shareno sensitive capabilityresolve_secretno sensitive capabilitysandbox_envno sensitive capabilitysso_statusno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
store_secretno sensitive capabilityteam_deleteno sensitive capabilityteam_initno sensitive capabilityteam_listno sensitive capabilityteam_pullno sensitive capabilityteam_pushno sensitive capabilityteam_resolveno sensitive capabilitytotp_codeno sensitive capabilitytotp_deleteno sensitive capabilitytotp_listno sensitive capabilitytotp_storeno sensitive capabilityunsandbox_envno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
B 81/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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