Keplr Wallet — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@keplr-wallet/keplr-wallet-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@keplr-wallet/keplr-wallet-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@keplr-wallet/keplr-wallet-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (68 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/providers/biometric.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/providers/biometric.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/providers/biometric.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/providers/biometric.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/vault-key.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/vault-key.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/vault-key.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/vault-key.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/vault.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/vault.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/vault.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/vault.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/webauthn/cli-handler.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/webauthn/cli-handler.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/webauthn/cli-handler.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/webauthn/cli-handler.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/adapter-loader.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapter-loader.js:36`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/adapter-loader.js"
},
"evidence": "const mod = await import(name); const factory = mod.default; if (typeof factory !== \"funct",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/adapter-loader.js",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/config/loader.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/config/loader.js:31`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/config/loader.js"
},
"evidence": "const mod = await import(filepath); const config = mod.default ?? mod; return mergeEnvVars(config)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/config/loader.js",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:44`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const mod = await import(entry); const factory = mod.default ?? mod; const resolved = type",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "onboarding-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check-vault-health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "switch-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export-mnemonic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-account-addresses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-installed-adapters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-available-methods",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-disable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-verify-setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth-provider-disable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-pending-actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel-pending-action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm-action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-transaction-history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cosmwasm-query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cosmwasm-contract-info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cosmwasm-list-contracts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cosmwasm-execute",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "cosmwasm-instantiate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-preview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "multi-action-list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "osmosis-quote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "osmosis-swap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-cosmos-chains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-fee-tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-cosmos-address",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-balances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-staking-info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-transaction-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-validators",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-unbonding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-proposals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-proposal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-ibc-channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cosmos-sign-arbitrary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cosmos-verify-signature",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send-tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ibc-transfer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delegate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "undelegate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "redelegate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel-unbonding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claim-rewards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claim-all-rewards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vote-governance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_configure_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_validate_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_get_payment_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_get_usage_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_get_usage_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_get_credit_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keplr_api_list_chains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe-tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search-tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-portfolio",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bfa5df9144d874cc1ce37002df7ce69ffe1b53456e2e764df42603a8727cc968",
"stats": {
"tools": 68,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}