Karbon MCP Server
karbon-mcp-server
npm
v0.2.4
Source verified
Published by mad-man-dan — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Unofficial MCP server for Karbon practice management — connect Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Copilot, or any MCP client to your Karbon instance.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([update_business_card, list_entity_files, download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [update_business_card, list_entity_files, download_file] → sinks [upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow update_business_card → upload_file
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import * as fs from "node:fs"; import * as os from "node:os"; import * as path f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_fileingests untrusted inputlist_entity_filesingests untrusted inputupdate_business_cardingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressadd_team_membersno sensitive capabilitycreate_client_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_custom_fieldno sensitive capabilitycreate_manual_paymentno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
create_organizationno sensitive capabilitycreate_work_itemno sensitive capabilitycreate_work_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_custom_fieldno sensitive capabilitydelete_manual_paymentno sensitive capabilityget_business_cardno sensitive capabilityget_client_groupno sensitive capabilityget_commentno sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_custom_field_valuesno sensitive capabilityget_estimate_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_noteno sensitive capabilityget_organizationno sensitive capabilityget_paymentno sensitive capabilityget_teamno sensitive capabilityget_tenant_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_time_entryno sensitive capabilityget_timesheetno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilityget_work_itemno sensitive capabilityget_work_scheduleno sensitive capabilityget_work_templateno sensitive capabilitylist_client_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_custom_fieldsno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_organizationsno sensitive capabilitylist_paymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_time_entriesno sensitive capabilitylist_timesheetsno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_work_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_work_templatesno sensitive capabilityremove_team_memberno sensitive capabilityreverse_manual_paymentno sensitive capabilityset_custom_field_valuesno sensitive capabilityupdate_client_groupno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_organizationno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_scheduleno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.4 latest |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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